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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
POLICE POWER IN OHIO
GEORGE D. VAUBEL*
The author examines in detail the variety of approaches to
judicial supervision of the coexistence of state and municipal
power, and concludes that careful analysis by the courts and a
spirit of accommodation among legislators and administrators
are essential to achieving necessary statewide uniformity while
preserving the flexibility implicit in municipal Home Rule.
It is now nearly two generations since reform enthusiasts gave
great impetus to a movement for local government autonomy which
became known as Home Rule. In the interim a great variety of
changes have occurred in the American scene which have had or
will have direct effect upon both state and local government. To
mention but two, the role of the federal government has expanded
enormously in the governmental power structure, and the phe-
nomenon of megalopolis has made its appearance. Consequently, it
seems increasingly more advisable that studies be kept up-to-date to
determine whether the state-municipal structure, created so hope-
fully by early reformers, is standing the test of time. We need to
know whether it still serves municipal needs for autonomy and,
perhaps more importantly now, whether it permits the State to per-
form its function of solving problems which are more and more
found not to fit neatly into the territorial packages of municipal
corporations. This article is limited to the development of the law
in Ohio concerning only one aspect of this complex subject: the
division of authority in the use of the police power.
I. SOURCE AND SCOPE OF MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER
For over one hundred years, the broad expanse of governmental
power in Ohio was vested in the State. Subordinate political sub-
divisions gained authority by delegation from the legislature.1 Even
then, in the case of municipal corporations the famous Dillon Rule
of strict construction was uniformly applied.2 But in 1912 the Ohio
Constitutional Convention enacted Home Rule for Ohio municipali-
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University.
Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio 523 (1849); Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio
St. 118 (1887). See Perillo, Peace-and-Order Power of an Ohio Afunicpal Corporation,
3 CLnv.-MAR.-V. 45 (1954).
' E.g., Bloom v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461 (1877).
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ties with the accompanying loss by the State of its monopoly of
power.3
The supreme court early referred to the amendment in the fol-
lowing language:
The manifest purpose of the amendment in 1912 was to.. add
to the governmental status of the municipalities. The people
made a new distribution of governmental power. The charter of
a city ... finds its validity and its vitality in the constitution it-
self and not in the enactments of the general assembly.4
In other words, since 1912 Ohio municipalities need not look to
the legislature for enabling legislation in order for them to exer-
cise powers of government within their territorial limits,5 since
these powers have been granted to all municipal corporations
through this constitutional provision. 7 Except for occasional over-
sights,s experience since 1912 has confirmed that this first of the
primary purposes for the adoption of Home Rule has been achieved
in Ohio. With it has come as a necessary corollary a diminution of
state control over municipal corporations.
This grant of municipal power includes both powers of local
self-government and the power to make "local police regulations,"
3 OHIO CoNST. art. XVII, §§ 1-3, 7. The principal provisions of Home Rule
authority are contained in § 3:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-gov.
ernment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary,
and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.
" Billings v. Cleveland Ry., 92 Ohio Sr. 478, 483, 111 N.E. 155, 156 (1915).
Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958);
State ev rel. Hanna v. Spitler, 47 Ohio App. 114, 190 N.E. 584 (1933).
' Perrysburg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923); Akron v. Scal-
era, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939); Perrysburg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio St. 245,
140 N.E. 595 (1923). This authority was at first limited to charter municipalities,
State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913), impliedly over-
ruled, Youngstown v. Arnold, 15 Ohio App. 112 (1921), disapproved of, Perrysburg
v. Ridgeway, supra.
West Jefferson v. Robinson, I Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965); Struthers
v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923); Rowland v. State, 104 Ohio St. 366,
135 N.E. 622 (1922); Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
' Early transitional cases: Hughes v. Cincinnati, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 494 (C. P.
(1913); In re Smith, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 497 (C.P. 1913); In re Sherlock, 19 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 302 (C.P. 1916); Morris v. Conneaut, 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 289 (C.P.
1917); Magris v. Canton, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 312 (C.P. 1919). Even the supreme
court found power in statutory provisions although it rested its decision on constitutional
authority. Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918).
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Any careful distinction between these tvo areas of municipal con-
cern is beyond the scope of this article. In general though, matters
of wholly internal interest not affecting citizens outside of the munic-
ipality,9 such as the structure of government, the definition of pow-
ers and duties of different departments, and the method and man-
ner of selecting public officials, are matters of local self-govern-
ment.' 0
On the other hand, general laws are such as
relate to police, sanitary and other similar regulations, and
which apply uniformly throughout the state. They involve the
concern of the state for the peace, health and safety of all of
its people, wholly separate and distinct from, and without refer-
ence to, any of its political subdivisions - such as regulate the
morals of the people, the purity of their food, the protection
of the streams, the safety of buildings and similar matters."
It is to this flexible line of distinction between internal functions
and police power that Ohio courts have been most firmly com-
mitted through the years,' 2 despite occasional strains13 and early
misgivings.' 4
Within the constitutional term "police regulations," munici-
Later examples: Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Fairporr, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176
N.E.2d 224 (1961) (statute "fortified" constitutional power); Pritz v. Messer, 112
Ohio St 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925) (statutory and constitutional provisions caused
municipalities to be "doubly empowered . . . to enact zoning ordinances"); Leer v.
Eastlake, 7 Ohio App. 2d 218, 220 N.E.2d 121 (1966); Ermekeil v. State, 8 Ohio L.
Abs. 121 (Ct. App. 1930); Zelles v. Matowitz, 22 Ohio Op. 261 (Cleveland Mun. Ct.
1941), appea2 dismissed, 139 Ohio St. 627, 41 N.E.2d 708 (1942).
In a series of cases extending from a 1921 supreme court case to a very recent ap-
peals court ruling, courts have referred to OHIo GES. CODE § 3781 (1938) and its
successor, OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 723.48 (Page 1953), as constituting adequate
authority to sustain municipal ordinances which regulated the speed of trains within
corporate limits. See Blancke v. New York Cent. R.R., 103 Ohio St. 178, 133 N.E.
484 (1921); Bender v. New York Cent. R.IL, 3 Ohio App. 2d 150, 209 N.E.2d
589 (1963).
' State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 NX.2d 501 (1944); Moore
v. Evans, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 531 (Ct. App. 1932).
" Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
' Id. at 359, 103 N.E. at 517. See Silvey v. Montgomery County, 273 F. 202 (S.D.
Ohio 1921); State ex rel. Giovanello v. Loweilville, 139 Ohio Sr. 219, 39 N.E.2d 527
(1942); Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
' Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio Sr. 358, 121 N.. 701 (1918).
13 E.g., Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N..2d 224
(1961), noted in 23 OnIo ST. L. J. 557 (1962); State ex fdl. Canada v. Phillips, 168
Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
" E.g., Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
1968]
OHIO STA TE LA W JO URNAL
pal police power is, within the territorial limits of the muncipality,16
as broad as that of the State.'0 Municipal police regulations, how-
ever, must be reasonable,17 both to come properly within the mu-
nicipal power and to conform to due process and equal protection
requirements of the federal and state constitutions.18 The objectives
sought must be within the police power. The means adopted must
be suitable to those ends (that is, they must have a real and substan-
tial relationship to their purpose' 9) they must be impartially ap-
plied; and they may not be unduly oppressive to the individual nor
interfere with private rights beyond the necessities of the situation.20
Municipal police power some years ago temporarily received a
strained interpretation as it related to the prohibition rather than
the regulation of activities. The only difference between these two
is a matter of degree and not of kind. A prohibition might be as
reasonable under certain circumstances as a regulation would be
under others. Although this approach had been suggested in several
cases,2 ' some courts developed further restrictions. 2 2 Finally, one
" Silvey v. Montgomery County, 273 F. 202 (S. D. Ohio 1921); Benjamin v,
Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1967), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 904 (1958).
" Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957); Cleveland
Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918). Examples of judicially
approved municipal use of the police power: Lindsay v. Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 137,
174 N.E.2d 96 (1961) (make seizure and forfeiture of property used without knowl-
edge of owner to violate an ordinance part of the penalty); Dayton v. Miller, 154 Ohio
St. 500, 96 N.E.2d 780 (1951), noted in 13 OHIo ST. L. J. Ill (1952) (right to
create a misdemeanor of activity already an offense against the state); Welch v. Cleve-
land, 97 Ohio St. 311, 120 N.E. 206 (1917) (provides for punishment of a "suspicious
person"). For examples of the municipal regulation of business, see goeerally, Note, 15
W. REs. L. Rv. 195 (1963).
"T Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919); Cleveland Itlec,
Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 10 Ohio App. 2d 85, 226 N.E.2d 145 (1967).
OHIO CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 19; U. S. CONST., Amend. 14.
z, Leet v. Eastlake, 7 Ohio App. 2d 218, 220 N.E.2d 121 (1966).
Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919). In Columbus v.
Miqdadi, 25 Ohio Op.2d 337, 195 N.E.2d 923 (Columbus Mun, Ct. 1963), licensing
of the sale of goods manufactured in communist countries when applied to books and
papers was found to be arbitrary since no standards limited it to police power objectives,
In Myers v. Defiance, 67 Ohio App. 159, 36 N.E.2d 162 (1940), the requirement of a
bond from owners of laundries with plants outside the city conditioned upon the safe
return of a customer's ciothes was found discriminatory when no similar requirement
was made of local businesses.
' Frecker v. Dayton, 153 Ohio St. 14, 21, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (1950) (dissent-
ing opinion of Taft, J.); Columbus v. Mqdadi, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 337, 195 N.E.2d 923
(Columbus Mun. Ct. 1963); Frecker v. Zanesville, 35 Ohio Op. 234, 72 N.X.2d 477
(C. P. 1946).
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appeals court reached the conclusion that the power to prohibit
was not vested in municipal corporations unless the business was
inherently evil, because section 3, article XVIII speaks only of
police "regulations", not of "prohibitions."23 This theory seems
insupportable both as an interpretation of the language of the
Home Rule Amendment and in light of precedent.24 Even so, the
decision was affirmed by the supreme court but apparently on the
ground that the ordinance was discriminatory. 5 Only a few years
later the supreme court sought to clarify the situation.2 6 Although
it found that municipal corporations had been granted power to
prohibit, the court did not rest its decision on the ground that
police "regulations" were broad enough to include "prohibition."
Rather, it moved the source of municipal power entirely away from
this possibly restrictive term by finding that all Home Rule power
was derived from the first clause of the amendment, that dealing
with local self-government. The second clause, that dealing with
police regulations not in conflict with general laws, was deemed
not a grant but only a limitation upon the power previously granted.
The municipal power to prohibit has since been reaffirmed by the
court in sustaining a "Green River" ordinance.27 This decision
should finally lay the earlier theory to rest.
If not precluded from making prohibitions, municipalities must
nonetheless abide by the constitutionally imposed limitation that
police regulations must not be "in conflict with general laws." This
limitation has been construed to apply only to police regulations,
not to municipal exercise of power over matters of local self-govern-
ment.2 8 This means that although the first Home Rule goal-freeing
the municipalities from the necessity of seeking enabling acts from
the legislature-has been achieved, the second objective-freeing
them from state supervision over the exercise of their powers-has
been only partially established in Ohio. Only in the area of local self-
government is a municipality, and by recent decisions only charter
' E.g., Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Evendale, 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124 N.T.2d
189 (C.P. 1954); Washington v. Thompson, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 598, 160 NJ.L2d 568
(C.P. 1949); Schul v. King, 35 Ohio Op. 238, 70 N.Y.2d 378 (C.P. 1946).
Frecker v. Dayton, 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E.2d 419 (1949), affd, 153
Ohio St. 14, 90 N.B.2d 851 (1950).
' See Frecker v. Dayton, 153 Ohio Sr. 14, 23, 90 NY.2d 851, 855 (1950)
senting opinion).
2Id.
2' Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957).
2 West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.-2d 382 (1965).
Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
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municipalities, 29 supreme over state authority. For police regula-
tions, the state can exercise supervisory authority through the en-
actment of general laws which have the effect of abrogating con-
flicting municipal ordinances. In addition, there remain areas in
which the state retains exclusive authority, such as over "state mat-
ters" 80 or over areas where a municipality has only subordinate con-
cern.31 Into this power structure a series of court decisions must be
fitted in which health and police and fire department matters have
been termed as being of "statewide concern."82 These decisions can
"leavers v. Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33, 203 NE.2d 354 (1964); State ex rol,
Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960). The court's conclusion
in these cases that, absent a charter, an ordinance is invalid if at "variance" with state
law raises the question of whether the same approach will be followed in establishing a
variance as has been followed in finding an ordinance to be in "conflict with general
laws" in the field of police regulations. There is as yet no reason to think that it will
not be. For an excellent resum6 of the development of this new concept in Ohio
municipal law, see Duffey, Non-Charter Municipalities: Local Self-Government, 21
Omo ST. L.J. 304 (1960).
State ex -el. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951);
State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929); Niehaus v.
State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924).
E.g., in the creation of courts. State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112
Ohio St. 468, 147 N.E. 647 (1925). Municipal efforts to make civil service board de-
cisions final have been interpreted as denying common pleas courts' jurisdiction estab.
lished by statute and therefore ineffective. Cupps v. Toledo, 170 Ohio St. 144, 163
N.E.2d 384 (1959); In re Fortune, 138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E.2d 442 (1941); Klucar
v. Hull, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 305, 165 N.E.2d 246 (C. P. 1959). Contra, Penrod v. Woehler,
18 Ohio L Abs. 135, (Ct. App. 1934); Ferguson v. Collins, 16 Ohio L. Ab5. 6 (Ct.
App. 1933), appeal dismissed, 127 Ohio St. 419, 189 N.E. 4 (1933) (both on the
basis that civil service is a matter of local self-government free from state control). On
administrative management of courts, see State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St,
596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929); Underwood v. Isham, 61 Ohio App. 129, 22 N.E.2d 468,
appeal dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 320, 20 N.E.2d 719 (1939). In the latter case the
court confusingly talked of invalidity because of state preemption and conflict with
state laws rather than finding exclusive state power. See Hitchcock, Ohio Ordinances in
Conflict ioth General Laws, 16 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1942); Fordham & Asher,
Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHio ST. LJ. 18, 40 (1948). See also,
Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960) (highway construc-
tion); Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958) (de-
tachment); State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107
N.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952) (highway construction); Niehaus v.
State ex rel. Bd. of Educ., Ill Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924) (education);
Schultz v. Upper Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281, 97 N.E.2d 218 (1950) (annexation),
' Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941) (police and
fire), overruled as to "statewide concern", State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio
St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958); Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426,
166 N.E. 370 (1929) (health).
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be interpreted as establishing these areas as ones of exclusive state
control.33 But this has never been directly held, nor have munici-
palities ceased to evidence regular and active interest in them. The
use of the "statewide concern" designation has become much less
frequent, and the decisions in which it has been used show more
the court's concern over the recognition of state power than a de-
sire to establish it as exclusive.34 This has been exemplified particu-
larly in the police and fire department cases by the characterization
of state power as superior to that of the municipality. Therefore,
a matter of "statewide concern" appears to fit more comfortably
within the category of police regulations than within either that
of exclusive state power or of local self-government.3
5
F ordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Praaice, 9 OHIO ST.
L J. 18, 31-42 (1948).
1' See Bucyrs v. State Dept of Health, 120 Ohio Sr. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929);
State ex fel. Cuyahoga Heights v. Zangerle, 103 Ohio St. 566, 134 N.E. 686 (1921);
Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio Sr. 217,
70 N.E.2d 274 (1946). At times language unnecessary to the establishment of state
power has been used but it has been directed more toward withdrawal or preemption of
municipal authority than to exclusive state power. This has also been true in cases
involving the establishment by the State of health districts independent of municipal
corporations. State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.Y.2d 773
(1940); Bd. of Health v. State ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N.E. 215
(1931).
While a trial court in Ferrie v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E-2d 128 (C.P.
1946), spoke of conflict, the doctrine of preemption and the fact that money was not
being spent for a public purpose were probably necessary for it to reach the result it
did. A true conflict might be said to be the basis for the decision in Hecker v. State
ex rel. Cleveland, 111 Ohio St. 168, 144 N.E. 700 (1924).
Judge Williams in his concurring opinion to the police department case of State
ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944), gave independent
significance to matters of statewide concern along with local self-government and local
police regulations. But he too would have applied preemption to these matters rather
than finding them to be exclusively within the power of the State.
Judge Williams' theory finds some support in the health cases, but the constitutional
basis for, or the advisability of, imposing still another theory in the area of police
power is difficult to see. Neither the majority in Arey, nor the opinions of the court in
other cases involving police and fire departments as matters of statewide concern clearly
support Judge Williams in his approach. At the same time, they do not appear to hold
the power of the State to be exclusive. Rather, after coming close to establishing an in-
dependent statewide concern doctrine in the initial case in this area, Cincinnati v.
Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941), the court slipped back with varying
degrees of clarity in subsequent cases to the more traditional approach of findnug conflict
between state law and city ordinance. See State ex rel. Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St.
123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1943); State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio Sr. 203, 34
N.E.2d 219 (1941); State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E2d 49
(1941). In two other cases in this period, In re Fortune, 138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E.2d
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In order to trace in detail the scope of both municipal police
power and State supervisory power over it, we now iurn to an exam-
ination of the meaning of the constitutional provision that munici-
pal police regulations shall not be "in conflict with general laws."
II. WiN Is THERE A "CONFLICr"?
A. "Head-on Collision"
The extent of municipal independence from state control
varies with the expansion and contraction of the concept of local
self-government. The extent of state control, on the other hand, de-
pends on the scope of state police regulation and the interpretation
courts give to the "no conflict" requirement of the Home Rule
Amendment.3" This section will examine the court decisions bear-
ing on what constitutes a conflict, in order to determine whether
there has been any judicial distortion of the constitutional power
of the State to control municipal police regulations.
1. Nature of "Head-on Collision" Test
No discussion of what constitutes a conflict in Ohio municipal
law could begin at any place other than a consideration of the de-
cision in Struthers v. Sokol.37 In this case the Ohio Supreme Court
demanded a clear conflict before it would invalidate a city ordin-
ance. It established what has come to be known as the "head-on
collision" test, namely, that there is no conflict unless "the ordin-
ance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and pro-
hibits, and vice versa."3' 8 The court went on to list three circum-
stances which did not constitute a conflict: forbidding something
that the statute does not mention, failing to forbid what the statute
does forbid, and imposing different penalties even though they
might be in excess of what the statute provides. The court further
rejected an implied conflict when it said: "No act is either expressly
442 (1941), and State ex rel. Giovanello v. Lowelville, 139 Ohio St. 219, 39 N1l2d
527 (1942), reliance was placed on the Gamble decision, but no further clarification of
the statewide concern rationale was made while the fact of conflict between ordinance
and statute was obvious in each. Three lower court opinions did speak of "exclusive-
ness," Sullivan v. Civil Service Com'n, 102 Ohio App. 269 131 N.E.2d (1956); Tay-
lor v. Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N.E.2d 594 (1950); Smith v. Mayfield Heights,
63 Ohio L. Abs. 483, 108 N.E.2d 681 (C.P. 1952). Sea 25 U. CIN. L Rnv. 378
(1956); 20 OHio ST. L.J. 152 (1959).
Owo CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3, quoted supra note 3.
108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
Id. syllabus 2.
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or inferentially permitted or licensed by either of the ordinances,
or the statutes. On the contrary, all acts referred to are forbidden
and penalties imposed for violations."3 9 Finally, the court found no
impediment to the city ordinance simply because there was a state
statute on the subject even though this might result in a double
prosecution.
Naturally, the first requirement of such a "head-on collision"
test is that there be a valid statute. A statute invalid because it is
in violation of the state constitution cannot create a conflict with
a city ordinance.40 If there is no state statute pertaining to the
same subject matter as the ordinance there is no conflict. This im-
mediately creates problems of interpretation to determine what
constitutes the same subject matter. A strict application of the
"head-on collision" test obviates many of these problems.4' More-
' Id. at 268, 140 NXE. at 521.
Disabled Am. Veterans Chapter No. 2 v. O'Neill, 43 Ohio L Abs. 479
(C.P. 1944), in which an amendment (120 OHIo L 663 (1943)) to OHio GEN.
CODE § 13064 (1938) (now OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.12 (Page Supp. 1966),
forbidding lotteries for the operator's "own profit' was held to be in violation of Ol-o
CONST. art. XV, § 6, which prohibits lotteries "for any purpose whatsoever... " Cin-
cinnati v. King, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 433, 168 N.E.2d 633 (Cincinnati Mun. Ct. 1960),
in which OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2905.34, 3767.01 (Page 1953) were con-
strued together to reach the condusion that arbitrary exceptions made the former, an
and-obscenity statute, unconstitutional. '"There cannot be a conflict of legal consequence
between an existing ordinance and an invalid statute. Nothing can come in conflict
with a nullity." Id. at 438, 168 N..2d at 639.
Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918), in which a
statute making a crime of pickpocketing was held distinguishable from an ordinance
which prohibited a person from attempting to steal from another by other than force
and violence or putting him in fear; accord, Akron v. Williams, 113 Ohio App. 293,
177 N.E.2d 802 (1960), appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio St 287, 175 N.E.2d 174 (1961),
in which OHIO REy. CODE ANN. § 2923.01 (Page 1953), dealing with concealed
weapons, was held distinguishable from an ordinance prohibiting certain persons from
carrying weapons; Cleveland v. Gogola, 68 Ohio L Abs. 375, 113 NE.2d 264 (Ct.
App. 1953), in which OInO GEN. CODE § 13408 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.28 (Page 1953)), made it a crime for a tramp to enter a house or yard
uninvited, while an ordinance provided for the prosecution of a "common beggar" found
within the city; Stay v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 NX 2d 11 (1954), appeal
dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955), in which the silence of statutory trailer camp regula-
dons concerning the period of occupancy caused the upholding of an ordinance which
set requirements; but see OIO Rxv. CODE ANN. § 3733.06 (Page Supp. 1966), a
more recent statutory provision, which supplants this silence and is the subject of in-
terpretation in Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E. 90 (1964); Mayer
v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E.2d 617 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 621 (1938),
in which it was held stare licensing of motor vehicles did not prevent a city from re-
quiring inspection.
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over, it has been said as a general guideline that in interpreting a
statute and an ordinance there is a reasonable presumption the
city council did not intend a conflict and none will be found unless
reasonable construction makes one "manifestly apparent." 42
Even given an existing valid statute, the city ordinance is
not necessarily invalid. This had been the law before the amend-
ment;43 it was declared in the Sokol case; 44 and it has been regularly
held since.45 Coincidence of purpose, or duplication of remedy, has
not been permitted by the courts to be fatal to an ordinance. Never-
theless, the presence of a state statute presents conflict problems.
Courts must become involved in the sometimes tedious process of
interpretation to determine if the ordinance does in fact permit
what the statute prohibits or forbid what the statute permits. This
problem existed prior to the amendment,40 and cases in the notes
illustrate the process since.47 One frequent area of conflict between
4 Cincinnati v. Luckey, 85 Ohio App. 463, 87 N.E.2d 894 (1949) (syllabus 2),
aff'd on other grounds, 153 Ohio St. 247, 91 N.E.2d 477 (1950).
' State v. Ulm, 7 Ohio N.P. 659 (C.P. 1896).
" Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
" Springfield v. Hurst, 144 Ohio St. 49, 56 N.E. 185 (1944); Columbus v. Geren,
1 Ohio L. Abs. 534 (Ct. App. 1923); Contra, In re Smith, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 497
(C.P. 1913).
' Prior to the Home Rule Amendment a conflicting ordinance was thought to be
outside the power of a municipality. Hays v. St. Marys, 55 Ohio St. 197, 44 N.E.
924 (1899); Caskey v. Belle Center, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 153 (C.P. 1908); State
ex rel. Buddenberg v. Tooker, 5 Ohio N.P. 122 (C.P. 1897).
" In the following cases the ordinances involved were not invalidated because no con-
flict was found: Cincinnati v. Luckey, 85 Ohio App. 463, 87 N.E.2d 894 (1949), dealing
with OHio GEN. CODE § 7472 (1938) (now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5589.21 (Page
1953) ) which prohibited letting a locomotive "remain upon or across ...(a public
road] for longer than five minutes . . .," while an ordinance was construed to prohibit
blocking a crossing for ten minutes through the "operation" of a train; Canton v. Van
Voorhis, 61 Ohio App. 419, 22 N.E.2d 651, appeal dismissed, 135 Ohio Sr. 319, 20
N.E.2d 720 (1939), construed an ordinance limiting garbage collection to city employees
as being an implementation of power granted to municipal corporations over such mat.
ters by OHIO GEN. CODE § 3649 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.43
(Page 1953)); Cleveland v. Mulloff, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 324 (Ct. App. 1938).
Invalidating conflict was found in the following cases: State ex rel. Klapp v.
Dayton Power & Light Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 14, 225 N.E.2d 230 (1967), interpreting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4905.20-.21 (Page Supp. 1966), which provided that a
municipal corporation can require abandonment of a public utility service only by
application to the state Public Utilities Commission, while the city claimed the power
to terminate the right of a utility to use its streets without such application; State v,
Hess, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 129 (Ct. App. 1947), where state regulations would have per-
mitted "properly located and constructed privies of approved design" in trailer camps,
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state law and municipal ordinance has been that involving munici-
pal civil service regulations in police and fire departments. Findings
of invalidity have resulted when the court adhered to the theory
that the matter was one of statewide concern or, recently, if a non-
charter municipality was involved.4S
while district board of health regulations provided, "water flushed plumbing equipment
must be installed for camps accommodating 25 or more people."; Cincinnati & Subur-
ban Bell TeL Co. v. Cincinnati, 7 Ohio Misc. 159, 215 N.E.2d 631 (P. Ct. 1964), deal.
ing with Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4931.01-.11 (Page 1953), which authorized tele-
phone companies to erect poles along public roads and highways so as not to incommode
the public use thereof, while a city ordinance required telephone wires to be placed in
underground conduits. For questioning comments as to whether there was a conflict in
this case or even a police power matter involved, see Fordham & Asher, Home Rule
Powers in Theory & Practice, 9 OHIO ST. LJ. 18, 60 (1948); Hitchcock, Ohio Ordin-
ances in Conflict with General Laws, 16 U. ON. L. REV. 1, 12 (1942).
' In State ex -el. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N..2d 219 (1941),
the ordinance declared OHIO GEN. CODE § 17-1a (1946) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANNT.
§ 4115.02 (Page Supp. 1965)), dealing with additional leave for firemen, inapplicable.
In Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941), the city established
a separate pension system from that of the State for firemen and policemen. In State
ex tel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941), OHIO GEN. CODE
§ 4 86-9a (1946) prohibited educational conditions for civil service, while the city's
rule required a four year high school diploma. Smith v. Mayfield Heights, 63 Ohio L
Abs. 483, 108 N.E.2d 861 (C.P. 1952), and State ex rel. Giovanello v. Lowellville,
139 Ohio St. 219, 39 N.E.2d 527 (1942), involved conflicts over tenure. In the latter,
the fire chief was placed by ordinance on a year to year basis while Ohio Gen. Code
§ 4389 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 737.22 (Page Supp. 1966)) per-
mitrted removal only for cause. In State ex rel. Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50
N.E.2d 338 (1943), and Leavers v. Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33, 203 N.E.2d 354 (1964),
Omo GEN. CODE § 486-17a (1946) (now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 143.27 (Page
Supp. 1966)), established tenure during good behavior while the ordinance provided
for retirement at age 65. In State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 NY.2d
501 (1944) and Sullivan v. Civil Service Comm'n, 102 Ohio App. 269, 131 N.E.2d
611 (1956), OHo GEN. CODE § 4380 (1938) (now OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 737.12
(Page 1953)), designated the public service director to hear civil service charges while
municipal rules provided for hearing by mayor or city manager. In In re Fortune, 138
Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E.2d 442 (1941), OmHO GEM. CODE § 486-17a (1946) (now
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 143.27 (Page Supp. 1966)) provided for a right to appeal
a civil service board determination to the common pleas court while municipal rules
made it final. In Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947),
Orno GEN. CODE § 6346-13 (now OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.32 (1946) (Page
Supp. 1962) ), prohibited the assignment of wages but a municipal ordinance authorized
union dues checkoffs from the salaries of civil servants. In State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner,
170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960), OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 143.34 (Page
Supp. 1966) provided that "Vacancies in positions above the rank of patrolman in a
police department shall be filled by promotion from among persons holding positions
in a rank lower than the position to be filled." The ordinance, however, provided for a
qualification of five years service only on "a' police force for selection as chief. Omitted
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Illustrative of the Sokol definition of conflict in that the munic-
ipal ordinance "licenses" what the state "prohibits" is Kraus V.
Cleveland,49 in which an ordinance prescribing licensing of gamb-
ling devices was held in conflict with the state antigambling statute.
The converse is also said to create a conflict as is evident in the
case of Russo v. State5 0 where the defendant was convicted of con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor by permitting his stepson
to operate an automobile on the streets of Cleveland in violation of
an ordinance which barred persons under eighteen years of age
from doing so. The statute5 ' authorized the issuance of an operator's
license without regard to age. The court found that if a drivers
license is to be of any value it must act as permission to drive in the
state which would, of course, include the city of Cleveland, and
therefore there was a "patent conflict" between the ordinance and
the statute.5 2
from the statute was a sentence which appeared in an earlier form when positions In
fire departments were also treated: "Appointments to such vacancies shall be limited
to members of the respective departments.' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 143.34 (Page
1953). In both the Petit and Leavers cases the court treated the problem as involving
local self-government and found in each that the ordinance of a non-charter city was
invalid because it was at "variance" with the state law.
" 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159 (1939), involving OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 13056,
13066 (1938) (now OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.04, .15 (Page 1953)); accord,
State ex rel. Sergi v. Youngstown, 68 Ohio App. 254, 40 N.E.2d 477, appeal
dismissed, 138 Ohio St. 123, 32 N.X.2d 852 (1941), invalidated an ordinance which,
although by its terms licensed games of "skill", amounted to a subterfuge for per.
mitting gambling as disclosed by the pattern of its enforcement. C.f. Wells v,
Norwood, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 53, 100 N.X.2d 711 (C.P. 1951), sustaining an ordinance
where it was construed to license only amusement devices; Gerspacher v. Cleveland, 21
Ohio Op. 537 (C.P. 1941), in which conflict was found between an ordinance which
forbade erection of a newsstand on the streets within a prescribed area without a permit
and a statute which required the streets be kept free from nuisance and provided for
penalizing those who created obstructions.
14 Ohio Op. 34, 31 N.E.2d 102 (Cr. App.), appeal dismissed, 134 Ohio St.
510, 17 N.E.2d 915 (1938).
Omo GEN. CODE § 6296-11 (1945) (now OHIo REV. CODE3 ANN. § 4507.10
(Page Supp. 1965)). Age requirements now appear in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4507.08 (Page Supp. 1966).
2 This case is discussed in Hitchcock, Ohio Ordinances in Conflict with Genural
Laws, 16 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 42 (1942). Accord, American Comm. on Maternal Wel-
fare, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 533 (C.P. 1938); Epoch Producing Corp. v.
Davis, 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465 (C.P. 1917), in which it was ruled that approval of
the showing of motion picture films by a state board duly established for that purpose
prevented municipalities from barring exhibition within their limits. In both cases
conflict was apparent although it was only expressly labeled as such in the former
ovinion. See Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, Inc., 7 Ohio Misc. 292, 220 NEl2d
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It would seem equally dear that for a municipal corporation
to require a license in order to engage in a certain activity when
that activity is also made the subject of a license issued by the State
would thereby create a conflict. The municipal requirement would
be more than a cumulative regulation because inherent in the
requirement of a license is a prohibition against those who do not
obtain one. If a state license were obtained the city would prohibit
what the State permitted until a city license were obtained, while
if a city license were obtained, the city would be permitting what
the State prohibited until a state license were obtained. This is the
conclusion reached by the court in Auxter v. Toledo3 with respect
to a city requiring a liquor permit when one had already been
granted by the state liquor board. However, only a few years before,
Stary v. Brooklyn54 had sustained an ordinance which required
trailer parks to obtain a license, pay a fee, and abide by regulations,
151 (Canton Mun. Ct. 1966) and Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App. 483, 169
N.E.2d 558 (1960). The court in the former case refused to follow, and in the latter
made no reference to, the decision in Carnabud v. Norwalk, 70 Ohio App. 429, 46
N.E.2d 773 (1942), in which the court adopted what amounts to a concurrent power
theory with the one prior in time gaining the advantage, in this case, the ordinance.
In the unreported case of Gozion v. Lakewood, Civil No. 24885 (Cuyahoga County CL
App. Dec. 18, 1959), noted in 12 W. RES. L REV. 377 (1961), the court found con-
flict between a municipal ordinance which forbade retail liquor businesses within 800
feet of a school, church, library or public playground and the statute, O-O REV. CODE
ANN. § 4303.26 (Page Supp. 1965) which forbids it within 500 feet without public
hearing to determine the advisability of its issuance, where a permit ad been issued
to operate at a place 650 feet away. The court in Square Deal Coal Haulers & Yard-
men's Club, Inc. v. Cleveland, 19 Ohio Op. 71, 176 N.EX2d 348 (C.P. 1961), found
conflict with the same statute when an ordinance forbidding the use of any building
for the sale of intoxicating liquor within the same distance of such facilities as provided
by statute was construed as abrogating the discretionary power to issue the permit vested
in the state director of liquor control by the statute.
' 173 Ohio St. 444, 183 N.E.2d 920 (1962). OHao REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4304.12-
.27 (Page Supp. 1966) provided: "Each permit issued under sections 4303.02 to
4303.23, inclusive,... shall authorize the person named to carry on the business speid-
fled at the plce... described... "' The decision was forecast by Spisak v. Solon, 68
Ohio App. 290, 39 N.E.2d 531 (1941), which denied the municipality any "veto"
power, and by State ex el. Cozart v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 50, 11 N.E.2d 245 (1937),
in which an ordinance limiting city liquor permits to one for each 3,500 population
was held invalid because it limited the discretion of a state official given by statute,
OHIO GEN. CODE, § 6064-17 (1945) (now Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 4303.29 (Page
Supp. 1965)), to issue as many as one liquor permit for each 2,000 population, and
followed in C. L Maier Co. v. Canton, 94 Ohio L Abs. 434, 201 N..2d 609 (C.
1964), interpreting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3721.03 (Page Supp. 1966).
162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 US. 923
(1955).
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including occupancy limitations, in face of a statutory requirement
for a license and a payment of a fee. 5 The case seems to disregard
the sound reasoning underlying the law in this area. The court in
the Auxler case was forced to admit that language in Stary relative
to the validity of the license was not reconcilable with the Sokol rule.
But it distinguished the case on the basis that primary attention had
been directed at the regulatory aspects of the ordinance, not to the
license requirement, and for the additional reason that it was pos-
sible that a city might have some special interest with respect to
housing which was not present with respect to liquor control.50
Statutory changes have in effect made express the results of the
Auxter case by giving affirmative right to use a trailer lot to those
having a state license and by making a state license fee exclusive."
Thereafter, an appeals court, while also making reference to the
comprehensive nature of the state administrative regulations, had no
difficulty in finding extensive municipal licensing and regulatory re-
quirements invalid.58
Although a state licensing requirement precludes the munici-
pal corporation from making a further requirement of this nature,
it can hardly be said that it precludes all further municipal regula-
tion. What regulations could still be permitted? Certainly, those
which do not deny what the state permits but which relate to that
with which the license cannot fairly be said to be concerned should
be sustainable. For example, a license aimed at raising revenue and
thus essentially a tax or one establishing basic qualifications should
not serve to bar the reasonable exercise of the municipality's police
power aimed at correcting specific evils. The pattern developed by
cases seems to confirm this approach.5 9
5 OHIo GEN. CODE § 1235-3 (1946) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.04
(Page Supp. 1966).
" For the introduction of this new factor the court relied, not on a police regula-
tion case, but on one in which municipal regulation of the weight of vehicles using its
streets was held to be a matter of local self-government, Union Sand & Supply Corp. v,
Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961).
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3733.06, .07 (Page Supp. 1966).
" Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964).
See Auxter v. Toledo, 173 Ohio St. 444, 183 N.E.2d 920 (1962). In
Kovar v. Cleveland, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 579, 102 N.E.2d 472 (Ct. App.), appeal dilsmlssed,
155 Ohio St. 469, 99 N.E.2d 182 (1951), a dog license under state taxing statute, O1110
GEN. CODE § 5652 (1945) (now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 955.01 (Page Supp. 1966)),
did not immunize unmuzzled dogs from being picked up under authority of a city ordin.
ance enacted under powers granted by the Home Rule Amendment and OHIO GEN,
CODE § 3633 (1938) (now OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 715.23 (Page 1953)). Globe
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Another aspect of the Sokol test is that there is no conflict
simply because the ordinance forbids specific acts which are not men-
tioned in the general law or omits some acts that are mentioned.00
This is simply an elaboration of the "head-on collision" test. It
prevents drawing an inference from a limited state prohibition that
all else is to be free from regulation.01
This portion of the test is closely connected with the proposi-
tion, previously treated, that there can be no conflict until there is
a general law on the same subject matter as the ordinance. Only a
fine line exists between entering a virgin field and adding to state
requirements. All depends upon how narrowly or broadly the field
is defined. But in either instance the admonition of Sokol is that
there is no conflict unless the ordinance prohibits what the State
permits or permits what the state prohibits, all without the aid of
inferences. Added restrictions or more stringent ones than are pro-
vided in a statute are as valid as if there were no statute,02 because
Security & Loan Co. v. Carrel, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138 NE. 364 (1922), presents the
opposite situation: a state license requirement, OMO GEN. CODE § 6346-1 (1945), and
a municipal tax of loan brokers did not result in the invalidation of the htter. In
Cambridge v. Elliott, 135 Ohio St. 576, 21 NE.2d 669 (1939), state approval for the
showing of motion picture films apparently did not prevent a city from prohibiting
exhibition on Sunday. In Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 NE.2d 617, cert. denied,
305 U.S. 621 (1938), motor vehicle registration requirements were treated primar-
ily as a tax which did not invalidate municipal vehicle inspection regulations, since
the statute was not intended to create an unconditional right in view of stautory
grants of authority to municipal corporations to regulate vehides. In Leet v. FAStlake,
7 Ohio App. 2d 218, 220 N.E.2d 121 (1966), municipal regulation of advertising by
real estate brokers by means of "For Sale" signs was apparently found not to conflict
with general real estate broker licensing provisions of the state. In Holsman v. Thomas,
112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925), OHo GEN. CODE § 5868 (1945) providing
for the annual licensing of auctioneers did not prevent municipal regulation of auctioneers
selling a particular item such as jewelry with respect to ownership of the goods, the
time when an auction might be held and residency requirements since, as the court em-
phasized, the license was of a general nature. Courts have upheld the suspension of the
right to operate a vehicle within the corporate limits as part of the penalty for convic-
tion of the violation of municipal ordinances prohibiting reckless driving, Cincinnati
v. Sandow, 40 Ohio App. 319, 179 NE. 151, appea dismissed 124 Ohio St. 656, 181
N.E. 880 (1931), and driving while intoxicated, Kistler v. Warren, 58 Ohio App. 531,
16 N.E.2d 948 (1937). However, this is essentially a problem of penalties rather than
one of licensing.
' Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 NE. 519 (1923) (syllabus 3).
Id. at 268, 140 NE. at 521.
" Prior to the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment the opposite conclusion
was reached. Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439 (1859); Strauss v. Conneaut, 3 Ohio
CC.CT (n.s.) 445 (Cir. Ct. 1902).
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in such cases both the ordinance and the statute are prohibiting.
Neither can be said to be permitting anything unless one indulges
in drawing an inference. Thus there can be no prohibit-permit
conflict.6 3
Such an approach as that prescribed by the Sokol case, being as
liberally in favor of municipal power as the language of the amend-
ment would likely permit, could be expected to undergo some
stress over the years. Factors contributing to this are the natural
tendency to defer to the state when state-municipal policies are
claimed to be at odds and the desire to look for uniformity as an
answer where it seems appropriate. Additionally, the lines of de-
marcation in state-municipal relations are by no means always clear,
and in at least one area-finance and taxation-state control is
' Ordinances more restrictive than statute: Cleveland v. Sado, 43 Ohio L. Abs.
183, 61 N.E.2d 910 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 146 Ohio St. 126, 64 NX..2d 322
(1945). The court, in adopting a liberal approach to the matter, found that the statute,
OHIO GEN. CODE § 6307-56 (1945) (now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.58 (Page
Supp. 1965)), which required vehicles to stop five feet from the nearest door of a
streetcar stopped for loading or unloading, did not invalidate an ordinance which re-
quired stopping to the rear of the car, because the ordinance entered an area not cov-
ered-by the statute, if there were no rear door, and added little to the statutory require-
ment, if there were one. Coshocton v. Saba, 55 Ohio App. 40, 8 N.E.2d 572 (1936),
construed an ordinance which barred the sale of intoxicating liquor from 10 p.m. to 5
a.m. the following day not to be in conflict with a state Liquor Control Board regulation
prohibiting such sales from 12 am. to 5:30 anm. But sea Nell House Hotel Co. v.
Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944), and the doctrine of conflict by
implication notes 83-100 and accompanying text infra. Heidle v. Baldwin, 118 Ohio
St. 375, 161 N.E. 44 (1928), sustained an ordinance which required vehicles to come
to a full stop and change gears when coming to the intersection of a thoroughfare when
statutory requirements were not that stringent.
Ordinances defining a crime more broadly than statute: Columbus v. Barr, 160
Ohio St. 209, 115 N.X.2d 391 (1953), omitting from an ordinance prohibiting the
sale of lottery tickets the requirement that the sale be for the seller's own profit as was
provided in the statute, OHIO GEN CODE § 13064 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODIi ANN.
§ 2915.12 (Page Supp. 1966)), did not constitute a conflict; Sidney v. Thompson, 118
Ohio App. 512, 196 N.E.2d 112 (1962), sustaining the validity of in ordinance which
made a crime of being "in actual physical control of any vehicle . . ." while intoxicated
although the statute, OHIO Ruv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1965), omitted
this provision; Cleveland v. Jones, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 84 N.E.2d 494 (Ct. App.
1962), sustaining an ordinance prohibiting gambling transactions concerning more con-
tingencies than the statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.111 (Page Supp. 1966).
See also Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App. 355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954), where an
ordinance which omitted the element of scienter in making the sale of contraceptives a
crime as was required in a statute, OHIO GEN. CODE § 13035 (1938) (nOw OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (Page Supp. 1966) ), was said not to be in conflict, but the
court then interpreted the ordinance so as to make it require this element.
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admittedly extensive. Furthermore, the very nature of the case
method of piecemeal application of a rule is sufficient reason to
anticipate such difficulties. Whatever the cause, there are some
cases which either through the courts' approach or their manner
of expression have raised the question of whether, without quali-
fication, Sokol is firmly embedded.
In the 1920's the supreme court in several cases used language
somewhat different from, although at times coupled with, the "no
conflict" expressions of the amendment and of Sokol. Even though
these expressions might lend themselves to the interpretation of
stronger state control than "head-on collision" would indicate, this
is not necessarily true. There is no clear indication that any different
test was being formulated. Rather, these expressions might simply
have resulted from the emphasis in these cases which was directed
primarily at the state power issue. Additionally, the nature of the
municipal intrusion was perhaps more severe than might simply be
termed a conflict. 4 This method of expression appears again in a
more recent case without any discernible shift in approach.0 5
"Hecker v. State ex rel. Cleveland, 111 Ohio S. 168, 144 N.E. 700 (1924),
held that a village could not "prevent" what the State authorizes with respect to health,
by declaring a state authorized garbage disposal plant of another municipality a nuisance
or by refusing to issue a building permit for its sanitary expansion. In Bucyrus v.
State Dep't. of Health, 120 Ohio Sr. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929), the State could order
a city to provide for a sewage disposal plant as a matter of statewide concern and the
city could not "curtail the effect or defeat the enforcement of the sanitary regulations of
the state." Id., at 429, 166 N.E. at 371. Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St. 217, 148
N.E. 694 (1925) and Lorain St. R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 113 Ohio St.
68, 148 N.E. 577 (1925), both raised local self-government issues, but the court used
a police regulation rationale in striking down in the first case what amounted to a com-
plete denial of a Public Utilities Commission prescribed route for motor busses as a
"material interference" therewith, and in sustaining ordinances in the second case di-
rected against congestion of traffic, as not being an "interference" with Public Utilities
Commission regulations. In Niehaus v. State ex rel. Bd. of Education, 111 Ohio St.
47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924), although the court spoke of conflict, it seemed to place edu-
cation beyond the municipal power, while adding that the municipality was without
power to "thwart" the operation of the general laws, which would certainly be consis-
tent with the theory of state exclusiveness.
Clearly, a conflict existed in the Hecker, Nelsonvillk, and Nichaus cases, regardless
of the language used. Moreover, its use apparently did not affect the result reached in
the Lorain case in which the ordinances were sustained, and the Bttr;us case involved
what was essentially a state power problem.
" State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951),
states that a municipality has no right by the exercise of its local police power or
powers of local self-government to hamper the state in the exercise of its sovereign
powers not granted away.
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2. Preemption Doctrine
Expressions of preemption or what amounts to preemption are
of more concern. The theory is based on the entrance of a govern-
mental body into a field of regulation with the intent to seize it
to the exclusion of others. It is found either in the express words
of the regulatory measures or implied from their nature or that of
the subject being regulated, and presupposes the power to exclude.
Therefore, preemption is much more extensive than "conflict" and
in fact is in direct contradiction to the Sokol interpretation thereof.
Its adoption would open the door to a greatly expanded state power
over the municipality. Taken with a contracted definition of local
self-government and the requirement that a charter be adopted be-
fore a municipal corporation can fully exercise such powers, it could
all but eliminate Home Rule. In fact, the doctrine of preemption
would be a convenient, although not straightforward, way of chang-
ing the structure of state-municipal relationships without need for
additional constitutional amendments.
Has the preemption approach been adopted by the courts? It
has not to the extent of replacing the Sokol rule, as the cases pre-
viously discussed in this section would indicate. Yet the language of
preemption persistently makes its appearance in many of the opin,
ions of the courts so that it is necessary to determine whether it has
prevailed or is likely to prevail in a limited area of state-municipal
exercise of the police power. Those cases in which it was found there
had been no preemption in the course of sustaining the ordinance
can be set aside, as it is quite likely that the doctrine had not been
seriously considered.(' Also to be set aside are those cases in which
taxation is involved, for the nature of state power over the munici-
pality in this area by virtue of special constitutional provisions07 is
sufficiently different to justify a line of demarcation between the
" Akron v. Williams, 113 Ohio App. 293, 177 N.E.2d 802 (1960), appeal
dismissed, 172 Ohio St. 287, 175 N.B.2d 174 (1961); Davis v. McPherson, 72 Ohio
L. Abs. 232, 132 N.E.2d 626 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 164 Ohio St. 296, 130
N.E.2d 342 (1955). However, hints of this doctrine in Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio
St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955), proved In-
fluential in leading an appeals court in Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211
N.E.2d 90 (1964), to rest its decision on a preemption ground. See also State, ox rel,
Wynne v. Urban, 91 Ohio App. 514, 107 N.E.2d 637 (1952); Columbus Legal Amuse.
ment Ass'n v. Columbus, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 79 N.E.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1947);
Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E.2d 617 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 621
(1938).
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theory developed there and the body of law established around the
"no conflict" Home Rule provisions.68 It also seems reasonable to
give no undue significance here to those cases which deal with the
creation or maintenance of courts or the judicial procedure used in
connection with them, since by judicial construction this area is
within the exclusive control of the State. As a consequence, such ex-
pressions, although unfortunate because they undercut the theory
of state authority in this area, do not decrease municipal police
power authority.6 9
Before considering the remaining preemption cases, notice
should be taken of judicial expressions denying the availability of
the preemption doctrine in the area of municipal police power.
One such expression is found in dictum in an early landmark case:
[[]f there were a statute creating the same offense, it could not
be exclusive, even if the general assembly of Ohio in express
terms prohibited the municipality from legislating upon the
same subject-matter. City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St.
468.70
In a more recent reaffirmation of the no preemption doctrine, the
court said:
The Legislature cannot deprive a municipality of that constitu-
tional power, directly or indirectly. The validity of a local po-
lice regulation therefore depends not on any question of a state
prohibition or pre-emption of the municipal constitutional
power, but rather upon existence of a 'conflict.' 71
"' HO CONST. art XIII, § 6; art. XVIII, § 13. These provisions directly authorize
state limitations upon the munidpal power to tax and to incur debt. It is in the de-
velopment of the law with respect to them that the court has applied the doctrine of
preemption. Unfortunately this area is at times confused with that of police regulations
and conflict. State ex tel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962);
Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7,211 N.E.2d 90 (1964).
' State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962);
Columbus v. Miqdadi, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 337, 195 N.E.2d 923 (Columbus Mun. C.
1963). Nolan v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964), might
be given similar treatment as it involved express preemption provisions in a tan statute,
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4503.06 (J) (Page 1953), were it not for the fact that the
court also applied its preemption language to the regulatory aspects of the case.
" Myers v. Defiance, 67 Ohio App. 159, 36 N.E.2d 162 (1940) (designation of a
person within a county to receive service of process); Unlerwood v. Isham, 61 Ohio
App. 129, 22 N.E.2d 468, appeal dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 320, 20 N.E.2d 719 (1939)
(application of dty civil service regulations to court employees); In re Parks, 45 Ohio
L. Abs. 379, 67 N.E.2d 713 (1946) (manner of enforcing payment of fines).
"° Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 286, 120 N.E. 829, 830 (1918).
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This leaves relatively few cases which require more careful
scrutiny because preemption was ostensibly applied. One trial court
case is of little significance since it was decided when pre-1912
theories lingered.72 Another trial court decision dealt with the
preemptive effect that is to be derived from a limited grant of statu-
tory authority to a municipality and therefore was more concerned
with what constitutes a general law than with the conflict issue.18 Of
the remaining cases in which the courts affirmatively stated there
was preemption of a field by state regulation, an appeals court deci-
sion t 4 and one at the trial level75 were decided when the theory of
statewide concern had been in the ascendency for nearly ten years,
both placing special reliance on this concept. Only a few years be-
fore, Judge Williams in his concurring opinion in Sate ex. rel.
Arey v. Sherrill"0 developed the theory that police regulations were
limited to those ordinances which defined misdemeanors and pre-
scribed their punishment, while matters generally within the police
power were matters of statewide concern to which preemption was
to be applied when the state entered a field by way of regulation.
In addition, the Taylor decision did not in fact involve a conflict
issue.77 An appeals court in a recent case invalidated municipal
regulation of trailer parks on the ground of state preemption of the
field. Statutes had previously been passed which made the state im-
posed license fee exclusive and granted the right of uninterrupted
use to a licensee. But in reaching its conclusion, the court did not
draw a clear distinction between the theories of preemption and
conflict nor did it entirely separate the effect of applicable state tax
statutes. 78 The relationship between municipal zoning ordinances
which prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquor in named districts
and permits to sell at locations therein issued by the state Depart-
" Columbus v. Glascock, 117 Ohio App. 63, 64, 189 NX.2d 889, 890, appodi
dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 185 N.E.2d 437 (1962). The court carefully distinguished
between the areas of taxation and police regulation and pointed out the applicability of
the preemption doctrine only to the former. Accord, Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65,
19 N.E.2d 279 (1939).
"' In re Smith, 14 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 497 (C.P. 1913).
' Washington v. Thompson, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 598, 160 N.E.2d 568 (C. P. 1949).
" Taylor v. Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N.E.2d 594 (1950).
" Ferrie v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C. P. 1946).
" 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944).
The court found the plaintiff fireman was not entitled to extra compensation for
alleged overtime work because the regular work week was established by applicable
state laws unchanged by ordinance.
"' Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964).
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ment of Liquor Control was in issue in two lower court decisions.79
In each, the courts clearly found the ordinances invalid because of
conflict, but only after the state regulations of liquor were described
as preemptive of the field even though the Sokol case involved the
same field of regulation. In neither case was there any evidence of
judicial recognition of differences between the conflict and pre-
emption approaches. The final case, 0 also at the trial level,
amounted to no more than an expression of preemption as the
court discussed and placed its finding on "no conflict" precedent.
Only in the Ferrie case did the court need to depend upon the
preemption doctrine to reach a result unobtainable under the "no
conflict approach.81 But even this case cannot be used in full support
of the preemption doctrine because of the great weight the court
placed upon the expenditure not being for a "public purpose"
which it defined somewhat narrowly.
In the light of the analysis of the above cases several conclu-
sions can be drawn: (1) the Sokol, "head-on collision" test for con-
flict has not been replaced; (2) preemption has not received con-
sidered support as a doctrine but rather it has been mentioned only
from time to time largely as a method of expression and then almost
exclusively in decisions at lower court levels; (3) if there is any
discernible pattern in these cases as to when expression of preemp-
tion will appear it is that they generally involve areas (a) which
have been specially denominated of statewide concern,82 (b) where
Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App. 483, 169 N.E.2d 558 (1960), Canton
v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, Inc., 7 Ohio Misc. 292, 220 N.E.2d 151 (Canton Mdun.
Ct. 1966).
"Williams v. Jackson, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 164 N.E.2d 195 (C. P. 1959).
"' Ferrie v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C. P. 19-16). The court
construed statutory integration of child welfare care in the county on the basis of financial
need as an expression of intention by the legislature "to occupy the entire field of child
welfare;' Id. at 275, 72 N.E.2d at 132, so as to preclude the city from maintaining day
care centers for children of mothers who were not indigent. The court reached this
result without deciding whether the state program itself was exclusive. That the State
has the power to make separate health districts and charge them with duties otherwise
performed by municipalities has been previously noted. However, it is difficult to see
how what was essentially a supplemental program here could have constituted a "head-on
collision."
Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dis-
missed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955); Davis v. McPherson, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 232, 132 N.R.2d
626 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 164 Ohio St. 296, 130 N.E.2d 342 (1955); Ferrie
v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C. P. 1946). See State ex rel. Arey v.
SheriU, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.B.2d 501 (1944); Taylor v. Cleveland, 87 Ohio App.
132, 93 N.B.2d 594 (1950).
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state regulations tend to be extensive 8 or (c) a state license was
required. 4 It is unfortunate that courts have persisted in using pre-
emption language when it not only is inaccurate but generally un-
necessary. Too little consideration has been given in the particular
case to the full implications the adoption of such a doctrine would
have on municipal law in the area or to the danger that repeated
use of its terminology will lead to its adoption in the future.
B. Conflict by Implication
In treating the Sokol case it was concluded that the "head-on
collision" test for conflict did not permit an inference to be drawn
from a state prohibition that what was not prohibited was permitted.
If this was not clear from the statement of the test itself it became
so from the further statement by the Ohio Supreme Court that "(a]
police ordinance is not in conflict with a general law upon the
same subject merely because certain specific acts are declared un-
lawful by the ordinance, which acts are not referred to in the
general law . . . ."8 It is this rationale which underlies those cases in
which ordinances have been sustained even though they expanded
the restriction of a statute or state regulation or made it more
stringent.
Moreover, the court in Sokol directly referred to the claim that
inferences of permission might be drawn from the state prohibition
in these words: "[n]o act is either expressly or inferentially permitted
or licensed by either of the ordinances, or the statutes. On the con-
trary, all acts referred to are forbidden and penalties imposed for
violations."80 It would seem that there could be no conflict if both
the ordinance and the statute consisted of prohibitions. Yet at times
one feels compelled to say that what is not being prohibited is being
" Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 121, 120 N.E.2d 11 (1952), appeal dismissed
348 U.S. 923 (1955); Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App.2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90
(1964); Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App. 483, 169 N.E.2d 558 (1960), Williams
v. Jackson, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 164 N.E.2d 195 (C. P. 1959); Ferrie v. Sweeney,
34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C. P. 1946); Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes,
Inc. 7 Ohio Misc. 292, 220 N.E.2d 151 (Canton Mun. Ct. 1966).
"' Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 121, 120 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal diimrined,
348 U.S. 923 (1955); Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E.2d 617 (1938),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 621 (1938); Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 21 N.E,2d
90 (1964); Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App. 483, 169 N.E.2d 558 (1960);
Columbus Legal Amusement Ass'n v. Columbus, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 79 N.B.2d 915
(Ct. App. 1947); Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, Inc., 7 Ohio Misc. 292, 220
N.E.2d 151 (Canton Mun. Ct. 1966).
U Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923) (syllabus 3).
Id. at 268, 140 N.E. at 521.
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permitted, for on occasion we, as well as legislatures, express our-
selves in that way. Only a few years after Sokol the supreme court
recognized this compulsion in another landmark case, Schieiderman
v. Sesanstein.8 7 Here the court found an ordinance which totally
prohibited speeds in excess of fifteen miles per hour by motor ve-
hicles driven in school zones, in conflict with a statute which made
driving at a "speed greater than .. twenty-five miles an hour ...
prima facie evidence of a rate of speed greater than is reasonable
and proper."88 As the court said: "[W]hen the law of the state pro-
vides that a rate of speed greater than a rate therein specified shall be
unlawful, it is equivalent to stating that driving at a less rate of speed
shall not be a violation of law .... ,,so Additional reliance was placed
on a statutory provision which required these resrtictions not be
"diminished, restricted or prohibited by an ordinance, rule or regu-
lation of a municipality or other public authority."D0 In reaching
this conclusion the court rejected the dissent's argument that a
school zone ordinance was only making more specific the basic
anti-recklessness purpose of the statute, and that, in any case,
regulation of speed was a power of local self-government. In all
probability, the court's desire for uniformity and evidence of the
same desire on the part of the legislature through its prohibition
against municipal variations 1 proved too much for the court to
resist. Both the statute and the ordinance were prohibitions and
the ordinance was invalidated, a result specifically rejected by Sokol
for even more restrictive ordinances.9 2
121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
OHIO GEN. CODE § 12603 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21
(Page 1953) ).
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 NE. 158, 160 (1929).
OMO GEN. CODE § 12608 (1938). In fact, the court decided 32 years after
Schneiderman that the decision "rested largely" on this provision. Union Sand & Supply
Corp. v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 390, 176 NYE2d 224, 226 (1961).
"Express denial of power to a municipal corporation obviously does nor dearly
fit within the Sokol test, but rather raises the question of whether such a statute is a
"general law" within the meaning of the Home Rule Amendment This question, and
particularly this statute, will be considered in this regard in the next section of the article.
SIt has been suggested that there is no necessary implication from a negative
statute that lesser speeds are permitted by it since common law without benefit of a
statute would have permitted such speeds; and if only reasonable implications are per-
mitred ordinances will frequently be in conflict. See Duffey, Non-Charier A!ftnicipalities:
Local Self-Governmea, 21 OHIo ST. LJ. 304, 328 n. 65 (1960). In Eshner v. Lake-
wood, 121 Ohio St. 106, 166 N.E. 904 (1929), a companion case to Schneiderman v.
Sesanstein, 12! Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929), the court reached the same result
even though the ordinance proscribed speed over a rate which was the same as the
1968]
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The next stress placed upon the Sokol test came with the deci-
sion of Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus,8 involving a liquor
regulation.94 A Liquor Control Board regulation prohibited the
sale of liquor or beer by certain permit holders between the
statute. But the proscription of the ordinance was absolute while the statute provided for
taking other factors into consideration in determining reasonable speed, and made speed
over the stated rate only prima facie evidence of unreasonable speed. Reliance was also
placed on the provisions of OHIO GEN. CODE § 12608 (1938). These cases had been
anticipated in result in F. D. Lawrence Electric Co. v. Enterprise Lumber Co., 28 Ohio
App. 30, 162 N.E. 434 (1924), involving the same statutes. There principal reliance
was placed upon the no variation provisions of OHIO GE . CODE § 12608 (1938).
Provisions of OHIo GE . CODE § 12603 (1938) were amended within a few
months of the Schneiderman case obviating the problem present there and showing the
legislature's agreement with the result reached: "It shall be prima fade lawful for the
operator of a motor vehicle to drive the same at a speed not exceeding the following."
113 OHIO L. 283 (1929). With this express permission before it, the court in Schwartz
v. Badila, 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.E.2d 609 (1938), had no difficulty in invalidating
an ordinance which made speed less than that set by statute prima fade unlawful even
though this resulted, according to the ordinance, only when the speed was "inconsistent
with the absolute safety of pedestrians and other vehicular traffic by reason of weather
conditions, highway conditions, congestion of traffic, or any cause whatsoever . .... ld.
(syllabus 2). It has been said of this case that conflict was not inevitable and at most the
ordinance served to shift the burden of proof. Fordham & Asher, Home Rtle Powers it
Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. LJ. 18, 54, 55 (1948).
Both OHIo GEN. CODE § 12603 and § 12608 have been repealed by 119 Ohio L,
766, § 112 (1941). The former section has been replaced by OHIO REV. CODE ANN,
§4511.21 (Page Supp. 1965).
During this period, conflict by implication was rejected by the Supreme Court of
the United States on Ohio authority, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther,
281 U.S. 34 (1930), where a prohibition against children under 16 years of age from
operating a motor vehicle established by OHIO GN. CODE § 13002 (now OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4109.14 (Page 1953)) was held not to invalidate an ordinance
placing the age at 18.
" 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
9' Prior to this case, conflict by implication had been rejected in two cases involv-
ing liquor regulations, Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.B.2d 279 (1939); Cosh-
octon v. Saba, 55 Ohio App. 40, 8 N.E.2d 572 (1936), although in the latter case
the court had not been referred to any statute or regulation dealing specifically with the
subject of the ordinance. It has been suggested, Fordham & Asher, iome Rule Powers
in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 18, 48 (1948), that another pre-Null Hous
case, State ex rel. Cozart v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 50, 11 N.E.2d 245 (1937), actually
involved conflict by implication. The statute, OHIO GEN. CODE § 6064-17 (1945) (now
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4303.29 (Page 1953)) provided that "not more than
one... permit shall be issued for each two thousand population, .... " while the ordin-
ance was more stringent in that it provided permits "shall be limited to one for every
thirty-five hundred (3500) of the population of the city of East Cleveland...." If the
statute and ordinance were standing alone, the conflict that the court found would
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hours of 2:30 and 5:30 a.m., while a Columbus ordinance pro-
scribed sales between 12 midnight and 5:30 a.m. The court, rely-
ing on Schneiderman, concluded that prohibiting sales during
specified times was the equivalent of permitting them the rest
of the time, and therefore an ordinance which limited this latter
period was in conflict. As appears more clearly in the appeals court
decision 9 5 the court had to take into account other statutory pro-
visions which gave some credence to the idea that permission to
sell during the nonprohibited period was intended. 90 This approach
has been followed in other cases which have involved these liquor
control statutes and regulations.97
appear to arise from the implication, and certainly a rather compelling one, derived from
the negative language of the statute that the state liquor control department has been
granted permission to grant permits between 2000 and 3500 population, which is denied
by the ordinance. However, reliance on such an implication need not be made, since
specific authority to issue the permit therein involved was granted by OHIO GEN. CODE
§§ 6064-8 and 6064-15 (1945) (now OHIo Rrv. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.10 and 4303.15
(Page 1953) ).
$3 45 Ohio L Abs. 400, 68 NI.2d 210 (Ct. App.), ard, 144 Ohio St 248, 58
N.E.2d 665 (1944).
' OHo GEN. CODE § 6064-20 (1945) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.27
(Page Supp. 1966) ) provided that a permit "shall authorize the person named to carry
on the business specified at the place... described .... " OHIo GEN. CODE § 6064-15
(1945) (now Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4303.16-.18 (Page Supp. 1965)), provided
that D-3a permit holders were to pay an additional $400 if their place of business
stayed open after 1:00 a.m. and were permitted to sell liquor during the same hours
as a D-5 permit holder. The latter is a night dub operator which is defined as one
open habitually after midnight. OHIo GEN. CODE § 6064-1 (now OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4301.01 (Page 1953). From these provisions the court concluded that
sales after 1:00 a-m. were contemplated, since a D-3a permit holder gained no other
advantage for his additional fee, and the regulations of the Board adopted through its
rulemaking power set this time precisely.
'" See Columbus v. Mauk, 1 Ohio App. 2d 3S, 203 N.E.2d 653 (1963), despite
doubts of a concurring judge as to the soundness of the rationale of the Neil House
case; Kaufman v. Paulding, 92 Ohio App. 169, 109 N.E.2d 531 (1951), but prohibi-
tion of liquor on Sundays was upheld under authority granted municipalities by OHIO
Gi,. CODE § 6064-22 (1945) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301-22 (Page
1953)); Williams v. Jackson, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 164 N.E.2d 195 (C.P. 1959).
For further consideration of the question of municipal control of liquor see 12 W. RES.
L. REv. 377 (1961). Statutory provisions with respect to civil service promotions, OHIO
GEN. CODE § 486-15a (1946) (now OHIO RPEv. CODE ANN. § 143.34 (Page
1953) ), requiring "at least twelve months in the next lower grade or rank," did not
invalidate a municipal rule requiring two years service before a promotional examina-
tioa could be taken. State ex tel. Wynn v. Urban, 91 Ohio App. 514, 107 N.E.2d 637
(1952). In distinguishing Neil House, the court concluded that it "at least" impliedly
left open to a municipality the option to provide for a longer period.
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The Neil House case does not appear to be as serious an inroad
into the Sokol test as Schneiderman since, in addition to the support
of statutory interpretation, a "permit" was issued in Neil House
which was absent in Schneiderman. If this is a formal distinction
it is nevertheless one which ought to carry weight in the settlement
of an issue which might turn on an accident of phraseology.
The danger in Schneiderman, and to a lesser extent in Neil
House, is that the results reached will not be limited to the facts
of the particular cases and thus will serve to destroy the Sokol rule.
Fortunately for municipal police power enthusiasts this does not
appear to have happened. In several cases involving criminal stat-
utes and ordinances, the defendant has urged that since the ordin-
ance is broader than the statute it conflicts with implied permis
sion to do that which was not prohibited by the terms of the statute.
This direct attack upon Sokol has not succeeded.08
Despite these results, and the likelihood that sufficient prece-
dent exists to continue to wed the courts to the Sokol approach in
most cases, this approach has had to make room for "conflict by
implication." The future coexistence of these two essentially con-
flicting theories may not be a peaceful one. A recent case graph-
ically demonstrates the subtle distinctions which can permeate this
issue.09 The charge under a municipal ordinance was failure to
stop on a yellow signal. The ordinance required stopping, while the
statute' 00 indicated that the yellow signal serves to warn the driver
that a red light will be exhibited immediately after and that pedes-
trians lawfully in the intersection have the right of way. The statute
did not prohibit proceeding through the intersection on a yellow
light as did the ordinance but did it permit proceeding so as to come
within the Sokol test? 01 The court, citing both Sokol and Schneid.
" A statutory prohibition of lotteries for profit, Obo GEN. CODE §§ 13063
to-64-1 (1938) (now OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2915.10.13 (Page 1953)),
did not grant a privilege to operate not for profit, in Wishing Well Club, Inc.
v. Akron, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 406, 112 N.E.2d 41 (C.P. 1951). The supreme court has
based this result on the ground that all lotteries were unconstitutional under OIo
CONST. art. XV, § 6, and therefore the legislature could not be said to have impliedly
authorized them. Columbus v. Barr, 160 Ohio St. 209, 115 N.E.2d 391 (1953). How-
ever, in a case not involving lotteries, the court sustained an ordinance squarely on the
Sokol ground that a municipal ordinance can go further than a statute in prohibiting a
transaction without conflict. Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.1l2d 854
(1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 904 (1958).
" Springfield v. Stovall, 117 Ohio App. 203, 192 N.B.2d 72 (1962).
101 Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.13 (Page Supp. 1965).
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erman, ruled the ordinance invalid, based on the conclusion that
the statute implied that the motorist was not required to stop. Be-
fore the shortcoming of this rationale is belabored, consider the very
important emphasis the court placed upon the fact that "a motorist
is entitled to some assurance that the 'rules of the road' are the
same regardless of where he travels."' -02
C. Conflict Through Differing Policies
The final element in the Sokol test is the conclusion that there
is no conflict merely because "different penalties are provided for
the same acts, even though greater penalties are imposed by the
municipal ordinance."' 0 3 For many years courts have had no diffi-
culty in applying this rule. The power of the municipality through
the Home Rule Amendment to define minor crimes 0 4 and to pre-
scribe for their punishment'0 5 has been recognized. Providing by
ordinance for a lesser, 10 different' ° or greater 08 penalty than that
prescribed by statute has been accepted under Sokol as not con-
stituting a conflict. It has been held that the issue of conflict is not
resolved on the basis of the penalties provided.109 As to the
' Or, is this a necessary implication? See, e.g., Duffey, Non-Charter Munidpalities:
Local Self-Government, 21 Owo ST. LJ. 304, 328 n.65 (1960).
' Springfield v. Stovall, 117 Ohio App. 203, 206, 192 N.E.2d 72, 74 (1962).
But cf. Heidle v. Baldwin, 118 Ohio St. 375, 161 N.E. 44 (1928), where the court,
treating it as an additional regulation, did not question an ordinance which required a
vehicle to come to a complete stop when approaching an intersection with a thorough-
fare, although the statute merely gave those on the through street the right of way.
' Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923) (syllabus 3). See
generally Note, Validity of Municipal Ordinances Prescribing Penalties Greater then
State Laws, 20 U. CIN. L REv. 400 (1951).
a' In re Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949).
' Dayton v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 500, 96 N..2d 780 (1951).
' Lorain v. Petralia, 8 Ohio L Abs. 159 (Mun. Ct. 1929).
1' Toledo v. Best, 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961), appeal dis-
missed, 369 U.S. 657 (1962); Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio Sr. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11,
(1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955); Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St.
342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929); Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App. 355, 122 NE.2d 20
(1954); Kistler v. Warren, 58 Ohio App. 531, 16 N.E.2d 948 (1938); Hiram v.
Conner, 85 Ohio L Abs. 161, 173 N.E.2d 408 (Ravenna Mun. Ct. 1960).
Matthews v. Russell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949); In re
Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949); Ermekeil v. Suite, 8 Ohio L Abs.
121 (Ct. App. 1930); and a pre-Amendment case, Lorain v. Maraldi, 19 Ohio C.CL
(ns.) 58 (Cir. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 81 Ohio St. 539, 91 N. 1134 (1909).
"' Toledo v. Kholofer, 96 Ohio App. 355, 122 N.E2d 20 (1954); In re
Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949). Only one discordant note to the
acceptance of the validity of an ordinance which imposes a greater penalty than a statute
has been sounded, and that by Judge Hart, dissenting in Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio
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form of the penalty, constitutional limitations must be met.110
Nevertheless, the traditional penalties of fine or imprisonment have
been sustained, as has forfeiture of property used in the violation
of an ordinance'11 and suspension of the right to operate a motor
vehicle within the city.112
The generally well settled condition of the law with respect to
penalties under the Sokol test was rudely disturbed after thirty-five
years in Cleveland v. Betts." 3 In that case the court was faced with
the claim of conflict between an ordinance which defined carrying
a concealed weapon as a misdemeanor in the same terms as the
statute which made the offense a felony. 114 The court acknowledged
St. 120, 141-42, 121 N.E.2d 11, 22 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955).
Considerations in favor of uniformity of penalty have thus not prevailed.
However, two problems related to the punishment of crime appear to be un-
settled. It was held in In re Parks, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 379, 67 N..2d 459 (Ct. App.),
appeal dismissed, 146 Ohio St. 694, 67 N.E.2d 713 (1946), that the manner of col.
lecting a fine as it relates to the release of an offender from imprisonment has been
"covered by state law" (OHIO GEN. CODE § 13451-15 (1938)) (now OHIO RliV. CODE
ANN. § 2847.20 (Page 1953)) so that an ordinance providing for a different method
is in conflict and invalid. Two courts, Cincinnati v. Faig, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 145
NXE.2d 563 (Cin. Mun. Ct. 1957); Columbus v. Kraner, 111 Ohio App. 484, 169
N.E.2d 44 (1960), have come to opposite conclusions as to the validity of an ordlnance
setting a longer period of time for the prosecution of offenses against an ordinance than
that set by statute, OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1905.33 (Page 1953). The court in the
former case sustained the ordinance as being analogous to providing for a greater pen.
alty, while the latter court rejected this approach as to a longer statute of limitations
when the statute is "directed toward the municipalities and places a limitation upon their
actions .... " Id. at 487, 169 N.E.2d at 45. The Parks case has unfortunate overtones
of preemption and the Kraner case raises a question of whether the statute involved Is
a "general law" in the constitutional sense. However, the first case and perhaps the
other two cases relate to the judicial process and might be considered as coming within
the exclusive power of the state over such matters. As such, the results, and to some
extent the rationales, of the Parks and Kraner cases would be more acceptable than that
of the Faig case.
" Matthews v. Russell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949), and Io ro
Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949), involving OHIO CoNsT. art. 1, §
9, the provisions of which forbid cruel and unusual punishment but which are not
violated by the amount of the fine and the length of the term, but only by the kind of
punishment imposed.
' Lindsay v. Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 137, 174 N.E.2d 96 (1961).
112 Kistler v. Warren, 58 Ohio App. 531, 16 N.E.2d 948 (1938); Cincinnati
v. Sandow, 40 Ohio App. 319, 179 N.E. 151 (1931).
1 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
"' OrIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.01 (Page 1953). The statute provides that a
violator could be "imprisoned in the penitentiary not less thin one nor more than three
years," while OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.06 (Page 1953), provides that "Offenses
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that the Sokol approach would not permit it to sustain the claim, 115
but it stated that the permit-prohibit test was not exclusive. Rather,
it discerned a policy of the state to treat activities made felonies as
matters with "penalties of a severe and lasting character", 116 while
penalties for misdemeanors indicate less serious treatment. Admit-
ting such an ordinance as was before the court might be of advan-
tage to law enforcement, the court still concluded it could not per-
mit a municipal corporation to make serious crimes into mis-
demeanors "and finally dispose of such offenses in the Municipal
Court'- 17 thus defeating the policy of the state. Until this case,
differences between statutes and ordinances in the severity of the
penalties prescribed had not resulted in a finding of conflict. The
court, however, was not reaching an opposite conclusion, but rather
it was drawing a line at the point of the differences in degree of
offenses. This decision raises several policy issues. Two were men-
tioned by the court itself, namely, the policy of the state to treat
activities made felonies as serious matters and the desire of the
municipal authorities to advance law enforcement through the pun-
ishment of offenses of immediate concern to the well-being of the
community at the local level. These conflicting considerations are
not to be treated lightly. But an additional consideration involves
the effect this approach will have on the Sokol rule in general.
which may be punished by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary are felonies;
all other offenses are misdemeanors."
In fact, the court in Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 NE. 844
(1929), and a companion case, In re Brown, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N. E. 844 (1929),
seemed to find no conflict between statutes defining felonies and ordinances defining mis-
demeanors because they relate to different subject matters, one being a matter of statewide
concern and the other being of local concern. In both these cases and in Lorain v. Pe-
tralia, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 159 (Lorain Mun. C. 1929), ordinances were sustained which
prescribed different penalties from those prescribed by statute. A third offense was made
a felony by the statute but was not the subject of the charges. Although dismissal of the
affidavit was affirmed on other grounds, the court in Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App.
355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954), sustained the validity of an ordinance even though it was
almost a verbatim copy of OHIO GEN. CODE § 13035 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2905.34 (Page Supp. 1966)), except that the statute made the act a felony.
The Attorney General in 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 1539 (1919) expressed the opinion that
the state's making an act a felony did not prevent a municipality from making the
same act a misdemeanor.
' Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 389, 154 NE2d 917, 919 (1958).
' Id. at 390, 154 N.E.2d at 919. This policy approach might well be a curious
throwback to the early pre-amendment case of Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439 (1859),
in which the finding of a lack of municipal power arising from the failure of an ordin-
ance to make the same exceptions that a regulatory statute did, -was rested in part upon
the concept of conflict with legislative policy.
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How far is the concept of state "policy" freed from a "head-on
collision" test likely to be carried? As we will see, it has not yet been
expanded beyond the Betts case. But it now has life. The exclusive-
ness of the Sokol test, whether illusion or not, has been shattered.
The expanded use in the future of an approach focusing upon con-
flict through different policies might be accepted if the Betts case
constituted a clear gain, but does it? The case did accomplish the
preservation of a state policy, yet, was it necessary to invalidate the
municipal ordinance in order to achieve this result? The court
rather cryptically concluded that it was, for otherwise the matter
would have been finally disposed of as a minor one in the municipal
court. Although the statute provides for "final determination" of a
misdemeanor prosecution in the municipal court, 118 this would not
preclude a subsequent state prosecution, since a municipal prosecu-
tion has been held to be no impediment to one conducted by the
State.110 Actual holdings of this nature are few, and the rationale is
not clear,' 20 but apparently the courts fail to find the doctrine of
double jeopardy applicable and duplicate jurisdiction does no vio-
lence to the Home Rule Amendment. Is the court, by its suggestion
in Betts, indicating an undercutting of its no double jeopardy stand?
Or is it merely incorrect in seeing a danger in the municipality
OsIO REV. CODE ANx. § 1901.20 (Page Supp. 1966).
See Koch v. State, 53 Ohio St. 433, 41 N.E. 689 (1895). This result was
reached despite the dictum in the uncited very early case of Wightman v. State, 10
Ohio St. 452 (1841), to the contrary.
o Dicta in the following cases support the proposition that prosecution by either
the State or the municipality does not bar the other. However, in each the true Issue
was whether both could provide for punishment, which is the initial problem. Greenburg
v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918); In re Smith, 14 Ohio N.P
(n.s.) 497 (C. P. 1913); Edis v. Butler, 8 Ohio N.P. 183 (C. P. 1900), aJ'd, 68
Ohio St 645, 70 N.E. 1119 (1903); Emery v. Elyria, 8 Ohio N.P. 208 (C. P. 1899).
In Lorain v. Maraldi, 19 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 58 (Cir. Cc. 1909), aff'd, 81 Ohio St.
539, 91 N.E. 1134 (1909) either could punish, and a larger municipal penalty was
not against the policy of the State as a city might have particular need for it. But neo
2 Op. ATr'y GN. 1539, 1541 (1919), indicating that double jeopardy would prevent
a city from creating a felony. In Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.. 519
(1923), double jeopardy was treated as a legislative problem, which could be solved
by the State's barring its own prosecution after a city had prosecuted. In Wellsville v.
O'Connor, 1 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 253 (Cir. Ct. 1903), the dissent felt it necessary to
interpret Koch v. State, 53 Ohio St. 433, 41 N.E. 689 (1895) as treating prosecution
under an ordinance as being in the nature of a civil or quasi-criminal remedy for the
collection of a fine in order to establish distinct offenses and avoid the concusion of
double jeopardy. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Shimman, 122 Ohio St. 522, 172
N.E. 367 (1930), in dictum, expressed the opinion that each of the three sovereignties,
federal, state, and municipal, could punish offenses against the peace and dignity of each.
[Vol. 29
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
finally disposing of offenses considered serious by the State? If
the former, some would certainly applaud,' 21 although it is not
clear that municipal authorities would be among them. On the
other hand, if its fear was merely incorrect, what is left to support
the conclusion reached? As a practical matter the State probably
would not prosecute again an offense handled by a municipality, but
so long as it could, how would the upholding of such an ordinance
defeat the State's policy to treat certain matters seriously?
The principle announced in the Betts decision has been rapidly
developed through judicial application. The supreme court itself
was again faced with the problem in Toledo v. Best, 22 in which the
defendant had been convicted of driving while intoxicated on a
charge brought under an ordinance which did not require a mini-
mum unsuspendable three-day jail sentence as does the statute. -2
The court found that conflict as to the degree of the crime which
was an issue in Betts was not present in this case, and therefore it
continued to follow Sokol on a matter which involved only the
severity of the penalty.1 24 The case is noteworthy for this refusal
to extend the Betts ruling. Whether limited to penalties or appli-
cable to the whole spectrum of conflict cases, the broader implica-
tion of Betts concerning invalidity through conflict with a state
policy was not mentioned. Yet it could have been. The statute in
issue had been specifically amended to provide for this minimum
sentence12 5 in face of statutory provisions which established that a
judge has the discretion to fine or imprison if both are authorized
I See Anieau, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 4A.04 at 212.17 (1965).
The courts in Toledo v. Best, 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961), appeal dis-
missed, 369 U.S. 657 (1962), and Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App. 355, 122
N.E.2d 20 (1954), expressed the opinion that the only reason why ordinances which
duplicate statutory provisions were adopted in the first place was to raise revenue, a
purpose which the court in the former case thought no longer available because of
changes in the law with respect to the distribution of fines and costs. One authority,
however, sees in the power to provide for misdemeanors the meeting of an important
municipal need. 6 McQuillin, MUNIaPAL CORPORAIONS § 23.12 (3rd ed. 1949).
172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N..2d 520 (1961).
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4511.19, .99(B) (Page Supp. 1965).
=' In an earlier trial court decision, Toledo v. Ransom, 84 Ohio L Abs. 12, 169
N.E.2d 657 (Lucas County Mn. Ct. 1960), the same municipal ordinance was found to
be unconstitutional, not on the ground of a conflict of penalty despite Sokol, but be-
cause it permitted what the statute forbade, namely, the exercise of judicial discretion.
The court went on to reject the idea that the Betts case was limited to a felony-mis-
demeanor conflict, but it did not refer to or develop a conflict of policy approach.
" 125 Omo L. 461 (1953).
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by statute1 6 and he has in his discretion the power to suspend a
sentence. 12 7 A state policy specifically directed at special treatment
for drunk driving offenses was outlined. Although the court did not
mention this state policy, it ended its opinion with the observation
that the clinching argument against existence of a conflict was the
fact that the defendant could have been given the same sentence
under the statute as he was given under the ordinance. A three-day
jail sentence had been imposed without suspension. Of course, Betts
was not concerned with whether the State might have given as light a
sentence as the city but rather with whether the city was capable
of treating the crime as severely as the State. Viewed in this light
the court's statement in Toledo v. Best indicates that the very nature
of the conflict present in Betts was not present in this case. But this
overlooks the type of conflict that was present; the State could not
treat the charge here as lightly as the city could have althought it
did not. Does this amount to a conscious effort on the part of the
court to recognize policy considerations and to draw a distinction
between a situation in which the city could not follow the state
policy and one in which it might not follow? Or, does its explicit
reliance on Sokol amount to a rejection of all policy considerations
and a reduction of Betts to merely a specific rule applicable only to
the felony-misdemeanor relationship?12 If the latter, its danger to
state-municipal relationships in the area of police regulations, al-
though still formidable, is greatly reduced and is entirely eliminated
as to matters outside of the penalty area.
It would seem then, that Betts at least for the present time
stands only as a narrow exception to the Sokol rule. 20 Despite
doubts previously expressed as to the necessity of such a distinction,
it does not constitute a purely arbitrary classification in the penalties
area since more than just increased or potentially increased severity
of sentence is involved. As the court noted in Betts, a felony carries
with it constitutional procedural safeguards, such as indictment by
grand jury,8 0 and its consequences are of a permanent character
through the loss of citizenship rights.
OHIO REV. CODB ANN. § 2947.10 (Page 1953).
OHIO RiEV. CODE ANN. § 2927.13 (Page 1953).
Perhaps a third alternative is more likely in view of the actual opinion of the
court: that the court simply failed to consider the policy issues involved and viewcd the
case as a Sokol type penalties one.
' See Columbus v. Glascock, 117 Ohio App. 63, 189 N.E.2d 889, appeal dismisied,
174 Ohio St. 9, 185 N..2d 437 (1962) (dictum).
I Omo CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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A municipal court's' has taken the broader implications of Betts
at face value in striking down an ordinance involving traffic light
and speeding offenses as being in conflict with a statute which de-
clared that state statutes dealing with these and other traffic of-
fenses, omitting load and equipment violation penalties, were to
"be applicable and uniform throughout this state in all political
subdivisions and municipal corporations therein, and no local au-
thority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with
such sections."' 32 Although a conflict simply as to penalties was recog-
nized as insufficient to invalidate under the Sokol rule and no fel-
ony was present, the court construed the above statute in light of
increasing need for uniform traffic regulations as amounting to an
expression of state policy under the Betts approach with which the
ordinance could not conflict by prescribing greater penalties than
those provided by statute. However, this same statute in an ap-
peals decision was held to be no more than a restatement of the
Home Rule Amendment prohibition against conflict as interpreted
by the Sokol case.' 33
Aside from the question of the possible expansion or con-
traction of the Betts rule, it has received elaboration through judi-
cial application. Betts did not change the old approach that there
is no conflict if the ordinance makes a crime of activity which dif-
fers from that prohibited by statute. Therefore, the courts have re-
quired that the ordinance and the statute define the same crime
before there can be a conflict.' 3 4 Sufficient identity of terms to
constitute the same subject matter has been found even though an
antigambling ordinance covered broader gambling transaction con-
' Hiram v. Conner, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 173 N.E.2d 408 (Ravenna Mun. Ct.
1960).
2 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.06 (Page Supp. 1965).
Columbus v. Glascock, 117 Ohio App. 63, 189 N.Y.2d 889, appeal dir-
missed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 185 N.B,2d 437 (1962).
" Akron v. White, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 247, 194 N.B.2d 478 (Akron Mu. Cr. 1963),
which held an ordinance forbidding carrying certain describing weapons constituted a
different crime from OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2923.01 (Page 1953), which is limited
to concealed weapons. See Cindnnati v. Coy, 115 Ohio App. 478, 182 NYE2d 628
(1962), which held the presence of a scienter requirement in an ordinance prohibiting
the sale of obscene literature that was omitted in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34
(Page Supp. 1966) did not make it a different offense; Hicks v. Akron, 87 Ohio L
Abs. 530, 181 N.E.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1961), which held an ordinance which prohibited
the sale of any article "which may be used for the prevention of conception," did not
differ from former OHIo REv. CODE AiNN. § 2905.34 (Page Supp. 1964) which pro-
hibited the sale of an article "intended for the prevention of conception".
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tingencies than the statutes,""' but in the same case the court found
no identity when the charge under the ordinance was for a first
offense while the statute made only a second offense a felony. On
the other hand, an appeals court' 80 and a municipal court 187 seem
to have come to opposite conclusions as to whether the fact that
the ordinance was broader than but might still be applied to the
statutory situation provided the proper basis for the application of
the Betts rule.
The ruling in the Betts case with one sweep invalidates all
municipal ordinances which make the same acts misdemeanors that
have been made felonies by state statute. The importance of this
statement is made even clearer when one looks at the relatively few
cases that have been decided and sees the areas in which it has
already been held that a municipality cannot enter. They include
aggravated assault,88 the sale of contraceptives, 8 exhibiting ob.
scene literature for sale,140 and the malicious destruction of prop-
erty.' 4' If the municipal court case mentioned before 42 is con-
sidered authoritative, the whole spectrum of traffic violations would
have to be added. In considering the effect of this ruling it is not
inappropriate to note that of the nine cases directly relating to this
point all but one have originated from the largest cities of the
State. What effect the ruling is having on local law enforcement in
these large cities during an era of increased crime deserves some
thoughtful consideration and investigation.
III. CONFLICr "WITH GENERAL LAwS"
As has been seen, the source of the power of a municipal
corporation in Ohio prior to 1912 was legislation passed by the
' Cleveland v. Jones, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 184 NXE.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1962).
... Akron v. Vitoratos, 118 Ohio App. 98, 193 N.X.2d 434 (1963). Even
though the amount was not charged in the affidavit, an ordinance which defined malicious
destruction of property as a misdemeanor without any monetary limits was found to
conflict with OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.01 (Page 1953) which makes it a felony
if the value of the property is $100 or more.
Akron v. White, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 247, 194 N.E.2d 478 (Akron Mun. Ct.
1963).
i" Columbus v. Montanez, appeal dismissed, 171 Ohio St. 499, 172 N,.2d 304
(1961), noted in ed. note, 14 Ohio Op. 2d 401.
1, Hicks v. Akron, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 530, 181 N.E.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1961).
Cindnnati v. Coy, 115 Ohio App. 478, 182 N.E.2d 628 (1962).
Akron v. Vitoratos, 118 Ohio App. 98, 193 N.E.2d 434 (1963),
Hiram v. Conner, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 173 N.X.2d 408 (Ravenna Mutt. Ct.
1960).
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General Assembly. 143 If the enabling act contained an exception an
ordinance passed under it was invalid as being beyond municipal
power unless it contained the same exception. 144 If it provided for
the penalty that could be imposed, the city could exact no other.145
But with the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment municipali-
ties are in general no longer dependent upon legislation to enable
them to act. Municipalities are authorized to exercise all powers
within their interests and territorial limits which the legislature
could, so long as police regulations do not conflict with general
laws.' 46 Yet the laws passed by the legislature still play an important
role in state-municipal relations. In addition to their supremacy in
the area of police regulations, state statutes also prevail under cur-
rent theory 47 in providing for the structure of municipal govern-
ment, as well as the rules of government for noncharter municipali-
ties.'14 Whatever constitutes "general laws" with which the munici-
pal police regulations cannot conflict, they are not laws within the
legislative competence which deal with local self-government prob-
lems but rather those which deal with police matters. Further, they
are not laws dealing with power as such. The generality of power has
been conferred upon municipal corporations by other provisions of
the amendment, either by the local self-government clause, 49 or
that clause in conjunction with the police regulation clause. As they
do not include enabling laws, "general laws" do not encompass legis-
lative efforts to restrict power granted to the municipal corporation
by the people through their constitution, unless that constitution
so provides. The only express limitation upon municipal Home
Rule is the "no conflict" provision. As has already been seen, the
provision has not been construed to authorize the state to exclude a
municipality from a field by means of the state's own regulation of
the field-to preempt the field. It would seem even more clear that
this provision is not to be construed as justifying a simple denial of
, Bloom v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St- 461 (1877).
... See Akron v. Seitz, 18 Ohio C.C.A. (n.s.) 200 (Cir. Ct. 1908).
"' Caskey v. Belle Center, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 153 (C.P. 1908); BA.TEs OHio
STATS. § 1536-182 (1897) (now Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 723.48 (Page 1953)).
... Statutory grants remain necessary to authorize a municipality to act exuaterti-
torially or on matters which are not municipal. Prudential Co-op. Realty Co. v.
Youngstown, 118 Ohio St. 204, 160 N.E. 695 (1928).
" Leavers v. Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33, 203 N.E2d 354 (1964); State ex rel.
Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
OmIo CoNST. art. XVIII, § 2.
Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), cett.
denied, 357 U.S. 904 (1958).
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power. Moreover, so to construe it would create the incongruous sit-
uation of retaining in a large area of municipal affairs a two step leg-
islative enabling power, through withdrawal and rebestowal. Rather
than establishing self-government, this interpretation of the amend-
ment would make the position of the municipality worse than it
had been before, as it would subject it to the necessity of running
the gauntlet of interpretation twice. Then too, if this was intended,
the language used, "not in conflict with general laws," seems
inappropriate in comparison with what might have been used, such
as, "except as denied by the legislature" or, even, "to the extent
granted by the legislature." The phrase used is much more con-
sistent with an interpretation which recognizes the retention of
legislative supremacy in the area of police regulations than it is with
one which envisons a retention of the authority to deny and bestow
power.
A. Meaning of the Phrase "General Laws"
The courts have at times spoken of a "withdrawal" of power
from a municipality, or that the only power the municipality has is
that conferred by the legislature. Three observations may be made
about such cases. First, some can be explained as being involved
with powers left by the constitution in the State because they
were never granted to the municipality in the first place. They are
neither matters of local self-government nor of police regulations,
such as control over public schools'50 or the creation of courts and
attendant procedures. 151 Second, most were primarily concerned with
the question of the power of the State to act; having determined this,
usually there was no necessity for the courts to go further and speak
of a withdrawal of power from the municipality. 5 2 Finally, if these
cases represent a separate theory of power its theoretical basis is not
clear, and it has not received general application in that it has been
1 O Niehaus v. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924).
' ' Columbus v. Kraner, 111 Ohio App. 484, 169 N.f.2d 44 (1960). ThIs
is a possible explanation for the case which involved the question of a statute of lintita.
tions for the prosecution of offenses against municipal ordinances, The court, however,
found the statute, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1905.33 (Page 1953), to be a general one
at the same time that it found conflict between it and an ordinance because the statute
was construed to be a limitation on the power of the municipality.
" See State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E,2d 773 (1940);
Bucyms v. Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); Bd. of Health v,
State ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N.E. 215 (1931).
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limited to matters of statewide concern, particularly health s and,
temporarily, police and fire departments.'54 Nor could Home Rule,
as it has been known in Ohio, long survive if the theory received
wider application.
Although the "no conflict" provision does not authorize the
State to deny power to the municipality, nothing prevents the State
in the exercise of its general powers to grant additional authority
to a municipality through making the "no conflict" provision in-
operative. This result has in fact been reached with respect to zon-
ing procedures established by statute."' It might be questioned,
however, whether these procedural statutes are "general laws" with
which a municipality could not have otherwise been in conflict or
whether they deal with a matter properly within the meaning of
"police regulations."
" Bucyrus v. Dep't. of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 NL 370 (1929);
Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio S. 217,
70 NLE.2d 274 (1946).
' ' Smith v. Mayfield Heights, 63 Ohio L. Abs. 483, 108 NE.2d 861 (C.P. 1952).
"General Code, Section 4366-12, yields unrestricted powers to municipalities in
respect to zoning, if such powers are granted by the [municipal] charter.' Bauman v.
State ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio St. 269, 270, 171 N.L 336 (1930).
Nothing contained in the foregoing sections 4366.7 to 4366-11 inclusive shall
be deemed to repeal, reduce, or modify any power granted by law or charter
to any municipality, council or other legislative body of a municipality nor to
impair or restrict the power of any municipality under Article XVIII of the
Constitution of Ohio. Omo GEN. CODE § 4366-12 (1938) (now OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 713.14 (Page Supp. 1966)).
Another type of state statute imposes a duty upon a municipality. Here too the
problem of general laws arises. The court in Wilson v. East Cleveland, 121 Ohio St.
253, 167 NE. 892 (1929), apparently assumed such a law was involved when it found
an ordinance, which attempted to limit municipal liability for failure to perform its
statutory duty to keep its streets open, in repair, and free from nuisance, invalid be-
cause of conflict (see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Page 1953)). Since this
statute has been construed to impose liability upon a defaulting city in favor of an
injured party properly within its scope, it might be said to partake of the nature of a
regulation of the streets in two respects. One, it grants to users protection from certain
types of hazards, and two, it regulates indirectly against those hazards, both those
municipally created and those created by private persons. Viewed in this light, it can
be argued that such a law meets the requirement that in order to be a "general law" a
statute must prescribe rules of conduct for citizens. It is distinguishable from A situation
in which an implied permission for citizens to act was found to arise from a statute
which forbade the municipality to regulate as was present in Schneiderman v. Sesanstein,
121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929), with respect to OHIO Gm. CODE § 12608
(1938). Not all such duty-imposing statutes can be so construed. In any case, such
statutes do not suffer from the same infirmity as power-denying statutes do, that of at-
tempting to limit the constitutionally conferred municipal police power. Set also,
Gerspacher v. Cleveland, 21 Ohio Op. 537 (C.P. 1941).
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General laws, then, must be laws dealing with police regula-
tion general in nature, that is, applying uniformly throughout
the State, of more than local concern, and prescribing rules of con-
duct for citizens as distinguished from municipal corporations. The
supreme court has taken this approach, largely by way of dicta, to
formulate a definition of "general laws." 15 6 Also, "general laws"
does not mean common law, but laws enacted by the legislature.
For example, a city was free to impose a greater duty of care than
would otherwise be expected upon drivers of streetcars who come
upon another loading or unloading streetcar 11, 7 On the other hand,
the court, over objection,158 duly authorized administrative regula-
tions as having the force of law and therefore as being "general
S[The general laws referred to are obviously such as relate to police, sanitary
and other similar regulations, and which apply uniformly throughout the state.
They involve the concern of the state for the peace, health and safety of all
of its people, wholly separate and distinct from, and without reference to, any
of its political subdivisions-such as regulate the morals of the people, the
purity of their food, the protection of the streams, the safety of buildings and
similar matters.
Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 359, 103 N.E. 512, 517-18 (1913).
Section 6307, General Code, specifically provides that local authorities shall
not regulate the speed of motor vehicles by ordinance, by-law, or resolution.
It is sufficient to say that the general assembly of Ohio cannot deprive a munici-
pality of its constitutional rights.
Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 470, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
[I]f there were a statute creating the same offense, it could not be exclusive,
even if the general assembly of Ohio in express terms prohibited the municipal-
ity from legislating upon the same subject matter.
Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 286, 120 N.E. 829, 830 (1918).
Section 3628 is a general law in the limited sense that it operates uniformly
throughout the state. It is not a general law in the sense of prescribing a rule
of conduct upon citizens generally. It is a limitation upon law making by
municipal legislative bodies.
Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 345, 168 N.E. 844, 345 (1929).
. Leis v. Cleveland Ry., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920); accord,
State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 NXE.2d 501 (1944); Schwartz v.
Youngstown, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 229 (Ct. App. 1938). The Leis case would seem to negate
the suggestion that a municipality cannot enter the area of private law which was of-
fered in Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Onto ST.
L. J. 18, 60 (1948), as an explanation for the result reached in Wilson v. East Cleve-
land, 121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929), that a city could not condition Its
statutory duty to keep its streets open, in repair, and free from nuisance. Sea generally
Comment, The Power of Ohio Municipalities to Enact Private Law, 9 OHIO ST. L.J.
152 (1948).
"' See Lorain Street LR. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 NE.
577 (1925) (concurring opinion).
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laws."' 59
B. Regulation of the Conduct of Citizens
Drawing a line between denying power to a municipal corpora-
tion and regulating the conduct of citizens, as the definition of
"general laws" requires be done, is not always a simple process.
An examination of judicial treatment of a number of statutes
which have raised or could have raised this issue will demonstrate
this point. Section 3628, OHIO GEN. CODE, permitted municipali-
ties
To make the violation of ordinance a misdemeanor, and to
provide for the punishment thereof by fine or imprisonment, or
both, but such fine shall not exceed five hundred dollars and
such imprisonment shall not exceed six months.'6 0
This statute has been involved in the decision of a number of cases,
including Youngstown v. Evans.'' Although in this case the fine
actually assessed was within the limits established by the statute,
the court concluded that, even though the statute was general in
the sense that it was applicable uniformly throughout the State it
was not a regulation of the conduct of citizens generally. Instead,
it was only a limitation upon municipal legislative power and there-
fore not a general law within the meaning of the Home Rule
Amendment. The court stated further:
Section 3628, General Code, is not a law defining offenses and
prescribing the punishment therefor, and is not therefore effec-
tive to bring an ordinance purporting to define and punish of-
fenses in conflict with Section 3, Artidcle XVIII, of the Constitu-
tion.5
6 2
This expression came only after several lower courts had assumed
the statute's validity, the appeal from one of which was dismissed
by the supreme court.'6 But one appeals court had anticipated the
'Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 NE.2d 665
(1944); lorain Street R.R v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 N.E.
577 (1925); Coshocton v. Saba, 55 Ohio App. 40, 8 N.E.2d 572 (1936).
Now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 715.67 (Page 1953).
161121 Ohio St. 342. 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
Id. (syllabus 2).
Brannon v. Wilmington, 31 Ohio App. 307, 165 N.E. 311, appea dismised,
119 Ohio St. 652, 166 NE. 199 (1928) (although the fine assessed was less than
statutory limits, the ordinance which exceeded was invalidated); Mfagris v. Canton, 22
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 312 (C.P. 1919); In re Sherlock, 19 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 302 (C.P.
1916). In the last two cases OHIo GEN. CODE § 3628) (1938) was considered and
the ordinances in each instance were found to be within its limits.
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result of Evans, at least with respect to charter cities. 10 4 Since this
decision, the statutory provision has been treated as ineffective to
restrict the municipality in prescribing penalties for misdemean-
ors.165 This same result was reached subsequently with respect to a
similar statute,'06 again, however, only after a false start.10 '
The statements of the court in Evans, and particularly that
made in the quoted portion of the syllabus, lead to a further ques-
tion. Although a power-granting statute containing a limitation
such as section 8628 is unnecessary as a grant of power and ineffec-
tive as a denial of it, could a prohibition against further regulations
or against the imposition of greater penalties by a municipal corpora.
104 _Marko v. Youngstown, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 477 (Ct. App. 1928).
See Matthews v. Russell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949); In ra
Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949); Kistler v. Warren, 58 Ohio App.
531, 16 N.E.2d 948 (1938).
A OrIo GEN. CODE § 3664 (1938) (now OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 715.55
(Page 1953)) granted power to municipal corporations to punish disturbance of the
peace in addition to other misconduct. OHIo GEN. CODE § 3665 (1938) (correspond.
ing to Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 715.56 (Page 1953)) provided:
Punishment of breaches of peace.- Such punishment may be by imposing and
collecting fines, or by imprisonment in the proper jail or workhouse %it hard
labor, or both, at the discretion of the court, but no such person shall be fined
for a single offense to exceed fifty dollars. Such imprisonment and hard labor
shall no, for the first offense, exceed thirty days, for the second offense, ninety
days, for the third offense six months, and for the fourth or any further repeti-
tion of the offense, one year.
Following Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929), the
court in Leipsic v. Folk, 38 Ohio App. 177, 176 N.E. 95 (1931), held the above
statute did not invalidate an ordinance which exceeded its limits although the fine
imposed did not.
"0 Morris v. Conneaut, 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 289 (C.P. 1917). Although the
fine did not exceed the limits of the statute, authorization by ordinance to impose more
was thought to have influenced the trial court in assessing the fine, so the conviction
of the defendant was reversed and the ordinance voided.
The statutory limitations placed upon the grant of authority to municipal cor-
operations to regulate the speed of railroad cars within corporate llmts--'such
ordinance shall not require a less rate of speed than four miles an hour, and in villages
having a population of two thousand or less, it shall not require a less rate than eight
miles an hour," OrHo GEN. CODE § 3781 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 723.48 (Page 1953) )-were assumed to be effective in a series of cases in which
ordinances that did not exceed these limits were involved. The courts used these litota.
tions as an aid in determining the constitutionality of the ordinances, finding conformity
created a presumption of reasonableness and validity. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Deleone,
289 F. 201 (6th Cir. 1923); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Grambo, 103 Ohio St.
471, 134 N.E. 648 (1921); Bender v. New York Cent. R.R., 3 Ohio App.2d 150, 209
N.B.2d 589 (1963); Banks v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 76 Ohio L. Abs. 83, 145 NXE.2d
350 (C.P. 1957).
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tion accompany a state regulatory statute and thereby be treated
as a regulation of conduct and thus as a general law? The Evans
syllabus might be interpreted to give support to such a proposition,
provided the provisions could be said to define and punish offenses.
In a case decided before Evans,s the court in dictum expressed the
opinion that a statute' 69 which denied municipalities the power to
set speed limits was invalid. It did not construe this statute to-
gether with a widely separated state speed regulating statute. There
is no reason to suggest any different result with respect to a regula-
tory statute which itself contains such a provision.1 0 Essentially, the
question remains whether such provisions are a denial of power or
a regulation of conduct. The location of a denial in the statutes
should make no difference. Moreover, a denial is not really the
defining of a crime or the prescribing of a penalty. By application of
the "no conflict" provisions of the Home Rule Amendment, a regu-
lation of conduct or "general law" is not characterized by its exclu-
sion of municipal action. Rather, it can only serve to prevent a
municipality from validly enacting conflicting ordinances. This has
meant that municipal regulations which are coincident with or are
more or less restrictive than state statutes are not invalid. Preemp-
tion by the State, based on the power to exclude, has generally been
held to have no place in the area of municipal police regulations.
Yet treating a statute as a regulation of conduct which precludes
any other regulation or denies the imposition of any greater penalty
would be to permit it to go beyond the role of a regulation, creating
an area of exclusiveness and reducing municipal power. It would
broaden the use of the concept of "general laws" to permit what
' Fremont v. Keating, Ohio St 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
:" Local authorities shall not reguhte the speed of motor vehicles by ordinance,
by-law or resolution .... The term 'local authorities' as used herein, means
all officers, boards, and committees of counties, cities, villages or townships.
OHIo GEN. CODE § 6307 (1945).
" In several additional cases involving regulatory statutes containing similar limi-
tations to those just discussed courts have either ignored them, Klein v. Cincinnati, 33
Ohio App. 137, 168 N.E. 549 (1929), obstensibly accepted them as general laws, but
with the decisions actually resting on other grounds, State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173
Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dismissed, 371 US. 35 (1962), interpret-
ing OMo REV. CODE ANN. § 1547.61 (Page 1953); Globe Security & Ioan Co.
v. Carrel, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138 N.E. 364 (1922) (susceptible of being put on another
ground); Noland v. Sharonville 4 Ohio App.2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964), involving
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.07 (Page 1953), or at least presented an alterna-
tive ground, Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 10 Ohio App.2d 85, 226
N.E.2d 145 (1967), involving Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1966).
None represents a dear-cut holding contrary to the conclusion stated in the text.
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judicial interpretation of the "no conflict" provision has found the
framers of the Home Rule Amendment never intended."Tl
A series of cases have been decided in which section 12608,
OHIO GEN. CODE, has played a part:
The provisions of § 12603 shall not be diminished, restricted
or prohibited by an ordinance, rule or regulation of a munici-
pality or other public authority.'72
Section 12603, OHIo GEN. CODE, referred to in the above statute
imposed traffic regulations primarily dealing with speed. The quoted
section was considered in two early lower court cases, causing the
invalidation of an ordinance in one,178 while in another the ordin-
ance was found not to violate its provisions.'" This statute became
of crucial importance in the decisions in the companion cases of
" Perhaps there is a middle position between denial of power and regulation
which could still properly be placed within legislative competence, that of the
definition of municipal power. Such an approach is at least suggested by the result, if
not the opinion, of the court in Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 10 Ohio
App. 2d 85, 226 N.E.2d 145 (1967). In ruling on the validity of a regulatory ordin-
ance, an appeals court had before it a prior 4-3 decision of the supreme court in State
ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 159 NX.2d 756
(1959), appeal dismissed, 362 U.S. 457 (1960), in which the reasonableness of a
similar ordinance requiring the underground installation of electric lines carrying over
33KV had been sustained. It also had to consider a subsequently passed statute, Onto
Rnv. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page 1953). Despite resort to varying theories, the court
ultimately found the ordinance unreasonable when applied to utility lines which were
constructed according to accepted safety standards. In one view it might be said that the
court was considering the statute as a legislative definition of what was reasonable - as a
definition of municipal power. Such definition, absent arbitrariness, is superior to the
judgment of the court, just as that of the council was. However, is it superior to that of
the council? The statute may delimit a power which is the subject of conflicting opinions
even on the supreme court, but from what source .does the state receive the authority to
define municipal power granted by the constitution? It may not be a denial of substantive
power in that the legislative judgment of what is reasonable might be the most accurate,
but it would nonetheless constitute a limitation upon the power of the council to make
such a determination. It would seem, therefore, that even if a statute were described
as a definition of municipal power it would in reality be a denial since it would deprive
a council of the authority to determine the scope of its power through its exercise,
subject to judicial review to prevent abuse.
OHio GiN. CODE § 12608 (1938), repealed, 119 OHno L. 776, § 112 (1941).
F. D. Lawrence Elec. Co. v. Enterprise Lumber Co., 28 Ohio App. 50, 162 N.!.
434 (1924).
"" Reed v. Hensel, 26 Ohio App. 79, 159 N.E. 843 (1927): adding In an ordin-
ance to the language of the statute that a driver was not to drive "so as to endanger
the property, life or limb of any person," and making driving over the stated speed
"presumptive" evidence of unreasonableness rather than "prima fade" as was stated in
the statute, did not "diminish, restrict or prohibit" its provisions.
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Schneiderman v. Sesanstein7 5 and Eshner v. Lakewood.176 The court
in each case developed "conflict by implication" by finding an im-
plied permission to lawfully drive up to the speed of twenty-five
miles per hour flowing from the provision of section 12603 making it
prima facie unlawful to drive above that speed. In each case, how-
ever, the court clinched its conclusion by resort to the provisions of
section 12608. Insofar as that section merely prohibits any conflict
with the provisions of section 12603 it poses no problem for our
consideration here, since this would make it a mere repetition of
the requirements of the "no conflict" provisions of the Home Rule
Amendment. If conflict by implication is the true basis of the deci-
sions and is thereby firmly established, then the greater restriction
on municipal power will have been achieved as a consequence of
a broadening of the "no conflict" interpretation, not as a conse-
quence of a denial of power. Section 12608 will have been treated
as a redundancy. However, the court used both sections to reach
its results, recognizing a lack of state power of denial but inter-
preting section 12608 as not constituting such a denial. In other
words, section 12603 was prohibitory interpreted to impliedly per-
mit, while under section 12608 the "no diminishing" provision was
also interpreted to amount to a permission to citizens to act.
Having reached this result once, to do it again would appear
to be of little consequence. But this approach bears within it the
seeds of exclusiveness rather than mere permission. To apply it to
a statute which is unrelated to a regulation as was involved in the
Evans case' 77 would be to change the result there by merely chang-
ing the labels. Even to apply it in a situation such as was present in
both Schneiderman and Eshner can easily lead to misconstruction.78
121 Ohio St. 80. 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
121 Ohio St. 106. 166 N.E. 904 (1929).
Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
' Some recent support has been given to the permission approach by an appeals
court in the case of Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 10 Ohio App. 2d
85, 226 N.E.2d 145 (1967), despite a minimum of discussion and the advancement
of several other theories for invalidating the ordinance. Although the exclusionary lang-
uage of the statute involved, Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page 1953), is less
strong than that contained in Omo GEN. CODE § 12608, probably of greater influence
upon the court was the more detailed description of the area barred to municipal regu-
lation. For, it would seem, the more particulars this contains, the more difficult it is,
and perhaps the more questionable it is to try, to distinguish a power denying stature
from a regulatory one. Nevertheless the question still is ultimately one of whether the
legislature is in fact regulating citizens by impliedly permitting activity within the de-
tailed area of proscribed municipal regulation. Again, such does not truly seem to be
1968]
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Aside from such misgivings and even though its presence might have
influenced the court greatly in developing the theory of conflict by
implication as to a partial refutation of the "head-on collision"
test, its application in these cases is no more restrictive of munici-
pal power than conflict by implication alone would have been,170
Essentially the same problem, except in a more current setting
and involving the more modern theory of conflict through differ-
ing policies, was presented in two lower court decisions. A munici.
pal court in the case of Hiram v. Conner180 apparently construed
a "no-conflict" statutory provision'" as amounting to something
more than a mere repetition of the constitutional prohibition. Al-
though it did not ignore the limitations imposed by the Evans case
against a denial of power, it avoided finding a violation of them by
deciding the statute involved was part of a regulatory measure which
defined a crime and prescribed the punishment therefor. It went
on to treat the statute as constituting an expression of legislative
policy advancing the modern need for uniform traffic enforcement
within the Betts felony-misdemeanor conflict rule, without which
it would have been unable to find a conflict since a difference be-
the case. If it is intended to have such a statute serve the regulatory purpose of gaining
compliance with statutory standards, this is never likely to be fully accomplished since
it can only be successful to the extent that municipal regulations exist and citizens have
reason to seek to avoid them. It is also very unlikely that such a statute would even be
considered in the construction of either prior or subsequent state statutes clearly regulat-
ing these same citizens.
... In a recent case, Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387,
176 N.E.2d 224 (1961), the court not only seemed to interpret the emphasis of the
Schneiderun decision to rest on § 12608, as mentioned earlier, but it appeared to be
critical of the decision in Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919),
which involved the authority of the municipality to impose weight limits on vehicles
using their highways, because it had not given the same importance to a statute, OHIO
GEN. CODE § 7250 (1938, similar to OHIO Gm'. CoDn § 12608 (1938), that the
court of the Schneiderman case had given to that section. For view that the limitatlons
of § 12608 were not applicable to a municipality since it was not a general law jee
Comment, The Status of the Police Power of Ohio Municipalites to Ednact Criminal
Ordinances, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 786, 794 nA8 (1963).
' 85 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 173 N.E.2d 408 (Ravenna Mun. Ct. 1960).
' Sections 4511.01 to 4511.78, inclusive, 4511.99 and 4513.01 to 4513.37,
inclusive [Operation of Motor Vehicles and Equipment; Loads; Chapters] of
the Revised Code shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in
all political subdivisions and municipal corporations therein, and no local
authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with such
sections.
OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. § 4511.06 (Page 1965).
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tween penalties imposed by ordinance and statute is not violative
of the "head-on collision" test.182
In the case of Columbus v. Glascock,18 3 dealing with the same
statute, an appeals court found it merely repetitious of the constitu-
tional prohibition. In answer apparently to a preemption argument,
the court found the State could not deprive a municipal corpora-
tion of power directly or indirectly and preemption had no place
in the police regulation field. Except for the Betts felony-misde-
meanor approach, the Sokol "head-on collision" test was applica-
ble.184 These two cases, although not finally determinative of the
issue presented in this section, serve graphically to illustrate it and
to bring into focus the problem of its relationship to the Betts rule.
Again, if no more than a "no conflict" redundancy was meant
by the legislature when it passed this statute no problem is presented.
If more was intended, the court in the Glascock case concluded
that it could not be achieved since the state had no power to pre-
empt. But the Conner court saw an express policy within the mean-
ing of the Betts rule. The first question raised is whether the Belts
approach was intended to be extended beyond the felony-misde-
meanor field. As will be recalled, Toledo v. Best'8 5 seems to suggest
a negative answer. If it were to be given broader application, could
it be used to avoid the rule against state denial of municipal power?
The municipal court in the Conner case apparently disclaimed any
such intention when, in distinguishing section 3628 involved in
-Evans, it described the instant limitation as not being general, but
one related to particular crimes, and therefore, as part of the defini-
tion of a crime and the prescribing of a penalty therefor. The court
thus attempted to fit its approach within the terms of the Evans
language. But defining a provision as part of a statute which creates
a crime ought not to save it from being considered as a denial of
See also Englewood v. Bettis, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 8 (Ct. App. 1933), appeal dis.
missed, 127 Ohio St. 504, 189 N.B. 4 (1933), (statute prohibiting traflic control de-
vices without approval of highway director held valid as regulation by general law,
not a denial of power).
' 117 Ohio App. 63, 189 N.E.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 185
N.E.2d 437 (1962).
, See Cleveland v. Sado, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 61 N.X.2d 910 (C. App.) appeal
dismissed, 146 Ohio St. 126, 64 N.Y.2d 322 (1945) ,involved OHIo GEN. CODE
§ 6307-6 (1945), the predecessor of OHuo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.06 (Page 1964).
The court cited the Scbneiderman case but seems to have simply made a liberal applica-
tion of the Sokol "head-on collision" approach in upholding the ordinance.
' 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 657
(1962).
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power if it otherwise would amount to one, that is, if it restricts
municipal authority more severely than the "no conflict" provisions
of the amendment.
Such a more restrictive effect has been given to a statutory pro-
vision as a result of the court's decision in the Conner case, by the
combining of a broader definition of "general laws" with the use
of the Betts rule for finding a conflict. As the supreme cour tin
Schneiderman and Eshner gave a similar effect to the provisions of
section 12608 by finding in them a basis for conflict by implica-
tion, so the municipal court in Conner has reached that result by
finding it an analogous statute a basis for conflict in policies.
Here lies the danger of the Betts case. It makes the determina-
tion of conflict and its accompanying effects depend upon the rela-
tively unlimited power of both the legislature to express a policy
and of the courts to find and interpret it. This still poses a con-
siderable threat to municipal power even if it is limited to statutes
regulating conduct, as in the Conner case. Such an expression of
policy has been found in order to prevent the imposition by a
municipality of a lesser penalty than that imposed by statute in the
Betts case. The Conner court would use a no less significant express
statutory statement to prevent a municipal imposition of a greater
penalty. What is to prevent a court from accepting a statutory state-
ment entirely prohibiting municipal regulation of subject matter?
We would then have full blown preemption. There would be no
denial of power; rather the "no conflict" provision would have been
used as a substantial aid in the reduction of municipal power.
Of course, there is nothing sacred about the "head-on collision"
test, nor is there anything inherently evil in the preemption doc-
trine. The possibility of the latter being applied is inherent in any
division of power between two levels of government. There was
nothing to prevent the court, at the time of the adoption of the
amendment, from giving it a preemption-oriented interpretation,
with only ambiguous precedent to prevent it from doing so now.
There remains, however, solace to Home Rule enthusiasts if
not in the Conner decision then in the fact that the supreme court
did not expand the Betts rule in Toledo v. Best so as to include
other penalty situations. By ignoring policy considerations in Best,
it has perhaps decided to forego that broad approach in the future.
Yet if a case such as Conner were presented to the supreme court,
or better still one involving a statute which more clearly evidences
the legislative desire to establish a policy against greater municipal
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penalties or the exclusion of municipal regulations, the court would
not be in a position to ignore the policy issue. In that event the
supreme court might very well fall back on the general course of
decisions which preclude preemption, whether through the de-
velopment of the "no conflict" doctrine, or through the rule that
"general laws" do not include statutory denials of municipal power.
Maintaining the line with respect to the meaning of "general laws"
would prevent an encroachment on municipal power, but as the
Schneiderman and Conner cases teach, this situation becomes more
perilous for Home Rule when the assault is accompanied by a
"conflict" attack.
C. Effect of Grant of Power by Legislature to Municipalities
At times the argument has been advanced that a grant of power
by the legislature to the municipal corporations of the state implies
an intent to take away that power not granted. This conclusion
stems from the continued retention in the code of a wide variety -of
statutes granting power to municipal corporations passed before the
adoption of the Home Rule Amendment. This problem is, how-
ever, one which should be easily answered in light of principles
already treated in the above discussion.
The argument bears a resemblance to the doctrine of conflict
by implication, which has received some acceptance by the courts
in dealing with state regulatory measures. But this doctrine should
not give any semblance of validity to contentions raised here. The
issuehere is that of municipal power. According to the Evans case,
the state cannot expressly deny power to the municipality. Surely
an implied denial is no less invalid. The basis for this conclusion
has been well stated by the supreme court in referring to an implied
limitation of power.:
This view, as we have seen, entirely ignores the very essential
fact that the powers of municipalities are now conferred by the
Constitution and not by Legislature.1sO
There are several cases in which this problem has been dealt
with in this fashion.18 7 However, in one trial court case the court
Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 68. 19 N.E.2d 279, 280 (1938).
' Section 715.55, Oo REV. CODE, is not a limitation on the right of a
municipal corporation to enact legislation under its constitutional police power,
and the part of the section quoted above appears to be needless legislation, as
the municipality is empowered to legislate on the matters therein stated, as
-well as on other police matters not specfically authorized by state law.
Akron v. Criner, 112 Ohio App. 191, 193, 176 N.E.2d 746, 748 (1960); acorl,
Coshocton v. Saba, 55 Ohio App. 40, 8 NX.2d 572 (1936). In Columbus Legal Amuse-
ment Ass'n v. Columbus, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 79 N.Y.2d 915 (C. App. 1947), &l-
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concluded that a statutory grant of power to the municipal corpora-
tion to regulate billboards acted as a recognition of them as a lawful
business and limited the authority of the municipality to entirely
prohibit them.188 As has been noted, the supreme court has recently
reaffirmed the proposition that a municipality has power from the
Home Rule Amendment to prohibit as well as regulate.189 An at-
tempt first to find and then to sustain a denial of a prohibitory
power should not receive favorable treatment from the courts.
By way of a resume of this section on "general laws," special
attention will be devoted to the supreme court case of West Jeffer-
son v. Robinson.90 This case raises the whole subject of municipal
regulation and prohibition of solicitors and peddlers going from
house-to-house and using the public streets to carry on their busi-
ness. The area is one in which courts have been almost uniform in
developing a wrong approach to the "general laws" question, a
situation which has hopefully been corrected by the Robinson
case.' 9 '
This case involved the application of a traditional "Green
River" ordinance, prohibiting unrequested door-to-door solicitation,
to the activities of an encyclopedia salesman. The court distin-
guished precedent which had found constitutional objections to im-
posing a license fee upon merchants who did not use the public
streets or places to conduct their business by noting that the
ordinances then in issue were not limited in their restrictive force
only to unrequested solicitation. 112 In dealing with the reasonable-
though the court found no limits from the statutory grant of power in 01110 GEN,
CODE §§ 3657-72 (1938) (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 715.48-.63 (Page 1953))
to municipal corporations to license businesses, it looked for possible state intent to
preempt the field. However, in Toledo, C. & 0. R. R.R. v. Miller, 108 Ohio St. 3881
140 N.E. 617 (1923), the court assumed that provisions of Oio GEN. CODE § 3781
(1938) (now Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 723.48 (Page 1953)) authorizing city authori.
ties to recover "by civil action" fines imposed for the violation of ordinances regulating
speed of railroad cars within corporate limits prevented the imposition of criminal
penalties. -
- Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Evendale, 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124 NZL2d 189
(C.P. 1954); OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 715.20 (Page 1953).
'" Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), ceri.
denied, 357 U.S. 904 (1958).
1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
19 See generally, Note, Regulation of Door to Door Solicitation by Enactment of a
Green River Ordinance. Application and Validity in Ohio, 32 U. CIN. L. REV. 92
(1963).
"2 See Wooster v. Evans, 92 Ohio St. 504, 112 N.E. 1082 (1915); Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Tippecanoe, 85 Ohio St. 120, 96 N.E. 1092 (1911).
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ness of the legislation, the court chose to follow the original Green
River case193 and the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States 9" upholding such ordinances as only a limited restriction to
protect the privacy of the home.
The court also dealt with the power of the municipality to
prohibit or regulate soliciting. As to the former, it reiterated its
position that the Home Rule Amendment granted power to munici-
pal corporations of the State to prohibit as well as regulate. Thus
it again rejected the opposite conclusion reached by an appeals
court in Frecker v. Dayton'95 and made amends for the failure of
the affirming majority on the supreme court in that case to deal
with that issue. The court also strove to make clear that the lawful-
ness of a business did not create a special basis for different treat-
ment; such a business could be regulated or prohibited like any-
thing else within the limits of the police power, requiring only that
a restrictive statute be reasonably directed at furthering the well-
being of the community.
Perhaps the most important portion of the decision was the
conclusion that sections 715.63 and 715.64 of the Omo REv.
CoDE,' 96 granting authority to municipalities to regulate peddlers
and solicitors with stated exceptions, were not "general laws" within
the meaning of the Home Rule Amendment. They were found not
to be licensing laws, regulations or prohibitions of conduct. Nor
= Green River v. Fuller Brush Co, 65 F. 2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933).
') Breard v. Alexandria, 341 US. 622 (1951).
' 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E.2d 419 (1949), aff'd on other grounds, 153 Ohio St.
14, 90 NE.2d 851 (1950).
' Any municipal corporation may license exhibitors of shows or perormnces
of any kind, hawkers, peddlers . . . and hucksters in the public streets or
markets. The municipal corporation may, in granting such license, charge such
fee as is reasonable. No municipal corporation may require of the owner of
any product of his own raising, or the manufacturer of any article manufactured
by him, a license to vend or sell, by himself or his agent, any such article or
product....
OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 715.63 (Page 1953).
Any municipal corporation may license transient dealers, persons who temp-
orarily open stores or places for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, and
each person who, on the streets or traveling from place to place about such
municipal corporation, sells, bargains to sell, or solicits orders for goods, wares,
or merchandise by retail Such license shall be granted as provided by section
715.63 of the Revised Code.
This section does not apply to persons selling by sample only, nor to any
agricultural articles or products offered or exposed for sale by the producer.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.64 (Page 1953).
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did they purport to provide for the government of municipalities.
Rather they only purported to grant and limit legislative power:
The words 'general laws' as set forth in Section 3 of Article
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution mean statutes setting forth
police, sanitary or other similar regulations and not statutes
which purport only to grant or to limit the legislative powers
of a municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police, sanitary
or other similar regulations.197
In clear, unambiguous language the court has reiterated the con-
clusions of the Evans case and has eliminated the restrictive effect
of numerous unnecessary power-granting statutes left in the Code
from pre-amendment days. It should also be noted that the court
failed to adopt a policy conflict approach.
This decision came only after a number of lower court opinions
had dealt with peddler and solicitor regulations in an entirely dit-
ferent fashion. Several of these involved the prohibition of the sale
from carts and the like in the public streets and parks of the com-
munity,198 while one involved a "Green River" ordinance which was
treated as prohibitory in effect.199 In each, the ordinance was found
invalid on the basis of several combinations of conclusions. One
conclusion was that the state's licensing of peddlers and its granting
of authority to municipal corporations to license them2 00 amounted
to a recognition of such a business as lawful and served as an im-
plied limitation on the power of the municipality to prohibit it as
" West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 118, 205 NE.2d 382, 386
(1965).
' Frecker v. Dayton, 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E.2d 419 (1949), aff'd on other
grounds, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 (1950); Schul v. King, 35 Ohio Op. 238,
70 N.E.2d 378 (C.P. 1946); Frecker v. Zanesville, 35 Ohio Op. 234, 72 N.X.2d 477
(C.P. 1946). Only in X-Cel Dairy, Inc. v. Akron, 63 Ohio App. 147, 25 N.3.2d 700
(1939), appeal dismissed, 136 Ohio St. 340, 25 N.E.2d 680 (1940), which was based
on a sketchy record and incomplete argument, had a court upheld such an ordinance.
1" Washington v. Thompson, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 598, 160 N..2d 568 (C.P.
1949), which also questioned whether an ordinance which prohibited the "practice" of
visiting applied at all when only one visit was alleged. The court in Defiance v. Nagel,
108 Ohio App. 119, 159 NE.2d 791 (1959), invalidated a conviction on the ground
that no "practice" had been shown from one visit, but then went on, over the protests
of the dissent, to express grave doubts over the validity of the Green River ordinance
in view of the exceptions contained in OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 715.63-.64 (Page
1953).
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 715.61, .63 (Page 1953).
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a nuisance.201 There was also found to be a resulting conflict either
with state policy in general2 02 or with the exception provided for in
the municipal power-granting statute.203 Finally, in all but the
"Green River" ordinance case,204 the courts also found that to pro-
hibit was unreasonably excessive when regulation would have served
the municipal purposes as well.
Reaching the first of these conclusions pays small heed to the
fact that merely because a general license is issued by the State
does not necessarily mean that specific regulations imposed by
municipalities will be in conflict.20 5 But Judge Taft in his dissenting
opinion to the supreme court decision in Frecker v. Dayton- 6
mounted a more general attack to refute all of these arguments. He
dismissed talk of a lawful business as begging the question as to
whether it could be regulated by use of the police power. He found
that regulation of street sales of ice cream was sufficiently related
to the safety of children to be neither discriminatory nor unreason-
able. In addition, without resort to the question of "general laws,"
he found the statutory provisions did not establish any policy against
prohibition or any right in peddlers to use the streets for their
business.
Not until the Robinson case did the court place the rationale
for rejecting these power-granting statutes as limitations upon mu-
nicipal power, either through implication or through their express
exceptions, on the much stronger ground that they were not gen-
eral laws and were therefore as ineffective as the provision involved
in the Evans case.
This was not the approach followed by courts in still an-
other group of cases which involved the statutes and ordinances
requiring licenses of peddlers and solicitors before they could ply
their trade within the corporate limits. Without reference to
a possible "general laws" issue, these courts found the failure to
include in the licensing ordinances the exceptions provided for in
" Frecker v. Dayton, 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E2d 419 (1949), arid on other
grounds, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 85 (1950); Washington v. Thompson, 80 Ohio
L. Abs. 598, 160 NE.2d 568 (C.P. 1949); Schul v. King, 35 Ohio Op. 238, 70 NE.2d
378 (C.P. 1946); Frecker v. Zanesvile, 35 Ohio Op. 234, 72 NE. 477 (C.P. 1946).
' Schul v. King, 35 Ohio Op. 238, 70 N.E.2d 378 (C. P. 1946); Washington
v. Thompson, 80 Ohio LAbs. 598, 160 N.E.2d 568 (C. P. 1949).
Id., and Frecker v. Dayton, 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E.2d 419 (1949), affd on
other grounds, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 (1950).
Washington v. Thompson, 80 Ohio L Abs. 598, 160 N.E.2d 568 (C.P. 1949).
' See Holsmn v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925).
"' 153 Ohio St. 14, 21, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (1950).
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sections 3672 and 3673, 01o GEN. CODE, or their successor section
715.63 and 715.64, OHio REv. CODE,2 0 7 resulted either in a conflict
in the "head-on collision" sense208 or in a violation of a prohibition
against municipal actions of this nature.200 In two other cases the
courts failed to question these sections in making their findings
that to require an identification card of solicitors did not amount
to a license in the statutory sense,2 10 and that the constitutionality
of an ordinance which omitted the statutory exceptions was not
called into question when the defendant failed to fit himself within
their limits.211
Without exception these cases represent an acceptance of
power-granting and limiting statutes as valid enactments and at
times as determinative of the effectiveness of municipal efforts at
regulation. Apparently this could result, even in face of the theory
of "general laws" as announced in Evans and others, because there
was no direct holding as to the validity of these particular statutes
by the supreme court until the Robinson case. This causes grave
misgivings over what effect other needless statutory grants of power
have had, both in judicial circles and perhaps more importantly
in the offices of municipal administrators.
As was suggested at the outset of this section, the true meaning
of the term "general laws" flows naturally from the provisions of
the constitution itself. Legislative denial of power is inconsistent
with the constitutional grant, and provisions of the "no conflict"
clause cannot comfortably lead to any other conclusion. The better
considered cases in this area confirm this approach. The most imme-
diate effect of this interpretation is to add to the freedom of munici-
pal corporations from dependency upon legislative enabling acts,
and (as to charter municipalities) from state control of matters of
self-government-the not inconsequential freedom from direct state
interference in the exercise of their broad police powers. It corre-
' See text of exceptions at note 196 supra.
Wooster v. Gentile, 116 Ohio App. 386, 188 N.E.2d 172 (1962). In Nickles
v. Echelberger, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 679, 31 N..2d 474 (Ct. App. 1935), a baker was
considered to be a "manufacturer," but as an alternative ground the court found the
ordinance discriminatory.
* North College Hill v. Woebkenberg, 59 Ohio App. 458, 18 N.R2d 614
(1938) (dairy company which processed raw milk was considered to be a "manufac-
turer").
"10 Mogadore v. Coe, 93 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 197 N.E.2d 570 (C.P. 1963).
'Ravenna v. Ivec, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 202 NXE.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1963).
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spondingly limits the method by which ultimate state supremacy
can be exercised in this area to one of affirmative regulation of the
conduct of the citizens of the State, for mere silence is also fore-
closed as a means to this end.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF OHIO'S CONFLICT APPROACH
Home Rule, or any other division of power between two levels
of government, presupposes that one level is better suited than the
other to meet a particular need. In order to test the effectiveness of
such a division it is necessary to consider whether the total needs of
the people for governmental action are being met at the more ap-
propriate level, with a minimum of friction between levels. Home
Rule ought to preserve for the superior body, in this case the state,
sufficient power to carry out its necessary functions, while at the
same time affording adequate local autonomy to the subordinate
units, municipal corporations, for them to meet satisfactorily their
varied individual needs. This requires a measure of flexibility in
order to permit shifts of emphasis from time to time to reach practi-
cal solutions to practical problems. Above all, there needs to be a
spirit of accommodation between the two levels as well as with the
courts in order to achieve a really workable system.
There can be little doubt that the one policy of the Ohio divi-
sion is to retain in the state sufficient power to promote the general
welfare through the exercise of the police power. Home Rule pro-
visions have released completely from state control only matters of
local self-government for charter municipalities, although they have
restricted the manner in which the state can exercise its supremacy
in the area of police regulations. In fact, rather than fears of
diminished state authority, there may be some justified misgivings
over the manner in which courts have from time to time sustained
the "withdrawal" of certain matters from municipal cognizance be-
cause of their being matters of "statewide concern," and the ease
with which this has been in part accomplished by the creation of
separate agencies under direct state control.
Despite these indications of an extensive residual state power,
there is less than complete capability on the part of the state to
achieve uniformity of regulation in the police power area because
the means of obtaining exclusiveness has been denied it. There can
be no denial of power to a municipal corporation; uniformity can
be achieved only to the degree to which the state itself regu-
lates. Although there has been some indication of the use of what
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amounts to the preemption doctrine, particularly under the "state-
wide concern" approach, it is neither structurally sound, clearly
established, nor properly adapted for extensive use in the context
of state-municipal corporation relations. This inability to achieve
uniformity directly or completely may tend more and more to be a
handicap to the state in its efforts to solve modern problems where
diversity may not amount to a virtue.
From the point of view of the municipality, its release from
dependency upon the state for enabling acts in order to exercise
powers either of local self-government or police remains a clear
advantage, as is the reaffirmation of the inability of the state to
deny it power. In this connection the continued existence of power-
granting statutes in the Code and resort to them as a source of
limitation of power is unfortunate. Not only is it bad theory that can
lead to erroneous results in litigation, but these power-granting
statutes can also serve to stifle imaginative action on the part of
municipal administrators to try to solve their own everchanging
problems. Until a thorough revision of the Code sorts out what is
simply redundant or is a denial of constitutional authority, one can
only hope that recent supreme court opinions will have a strong
effect in avoiding the potential harm created by this situation.
The municipal police power to prohibit has been moved out
from under a temporary shadow to full acceptance again. The Sokol
"head-on collision" test has, in general, given municipalities as
much freedom of action as the language of the Amendment could
permit. In its application by the courts, no real distortion is dis-
cernable. There has been a reasonable degree of strictness in defin-
ing the subject matter of statutes so as to permit latitude for munici-
pal action. This seems particularly true with respect to municipal
definition of crimes. Adherence to the approach of permitting
stricter municipal regulations and of finding general state licenses
to be no bar to specific municipal regulations should also be re-
called in this regard. The whole range of penalties is open to
municipal authority. However, through the felony-misdemeanor
conflict approach and in the general development of conflict by
implication, shadows have been cast upon the relatively clear pic.
ture of municipal power. They remain shadows because the courts
have not yet applied them to the full extent of their restrictive po-
tential. In fact, there are indications that the felony-misdemeanor
rule will not be given the broad meaning of conflicts with policy to
which it is capable of being put. Even so, these concepts have been
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limiting factors on local autonomy, and the full effect which the
felony-misdemeanor rule will have upon local law enforcement re-
mains undisclosed.
Inroads by the preemption doctrine would be of even more
serious consequence; but the doctrine can hardly be said to have
achieved even limited success, although it has been mentioned
enough in opinions to give reason for pause before ruling out sum-
marily the possibility of its eventually prevailing.
Flexibility in a power structure is necessary; but it is difficult
to achieve and destructive of clear thinking. It feeds upon vagueness,
vests great power in an arbiter, and creates potentially disruptive
forces. The Ohio situation appears to have elements of all of these
attributes. Constitutional divisions of power, if given literal inter-
pretation, often make it difficult to achieve flexibility; but the
broadness of the local self-government and police regulation terms,
coupled with the "no-conflict" provision, causes the Ohio Constitu-
tion itself to permit a considerable degree of flexibility and thereby
to lodge in the courts the role of final arbiter of the division of
power. This has been both an irritant, because of the uncertainty
it creates, and a boon, because it has permitted the courts to shift
and countershift in finding municipal actions to be matters of self-
government and in allowing the incorporation of new concepts into
the conflict test. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this is the
result merely of vagueness of concept or whether it reflects a con-
sidered response by the court to felt needs. Without indulging in
undue criticism, one might suspect that the former is not entirely
absent.212 Yet in the development of "conflict by implication" in
the Schneiderman and Neil House cases, and to a lesser extent in
the felony-misdemeanor conflict approach of the Betts case, shifts
in the importance of the relevant factors might well explain the
results reached.
The presence of this degree of flexibility might well serve to
meet the need of the State to achieve uniformity of regulation. It
has already provided two important tools in "conflict by implica-
tion" and "conflict through differing policies." It is suggested, how-
One author has concluded that initial uncertainties over objectives and inherent
classification problems caused by the dynamic nature of Rome Rule has until recently
made the Ohio experience an unhappy one. Blume, Afunidpal Home Rule in Ohio: The
New Look, 11 W. RES. L. REv. 538 (1960). There is no doubt that the criteria for
classification are burdensome both because of their relative artificiality and of their
number. Yet Home Rule may not be an unmixed blessing in a modem scene that is
asking more and more of the state.
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ever, that the further potent weapon of preemption continue tO be
denied the State in this field. Achieving uniformity where needed
will have been bought at too high a price if this should be per-
mitted to occur. Denial of municipal regulation, once it is applied,
can have a deadening effect upon municipal government. Moreover,
preemption can be extended far beyond State needs; and it is often
built on the sand of judicial investigation into nonexistent legisla-
tive intent.
Perhaps the most important ingredient in the process of power
allocation is a spirit of accommodation. This is the heart of the prob-
lem. Effective government officials at the state and municipal levels
as well as on the bench can, while asserting their authority, impose
self-limitation so as not to disrupt unnecessarily the other fellow's
business-so as not to create impossible situations which force harsh
solutions. There is every indication that a great deal more could
be done along this line by all concerned. Naturally the most power-
ful, the State, provides the most graphic examples of shortcom-
ings, just one of which is the failure to modernize and rectify the
obvious defects in the Municipal Code. Intrusion by piecemeal legis-
lation into essentially municipal areas as well as failure to bring
about legislative reforms in the broad spectrum of state-municipal
relations are further examples. But municipal and judicial officials
must also learn better to accomodate. Making a system of govern-
ment work may well take some of the same kind of "eternal vigi-
lance" spoken of so long ago.
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